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Mood Effects on Attitude 
Independent Effects of Mood Before and
Herbert Bless 
Universität M annheim, Mannheim,
Federal Republic of Germany
Norbert Schwarz
Zentrum fur Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen, ZUMA, Mannheim, Federal Republic o f Germany
This study investigated the independent effects of induced mood on the encoding of persuasive 
messages and on the assessment of attitude judgments. In Experiment 1, positive or negative mood 
was induced either before the encoding of a counterattitudinal message or before the assessment of 
attitude judgments. When mood was induced before message presentation, Ss in a bad mood were 
more persuaded by strong than by weak arguments, whereas Ss in a good mood were equally 
persuaded by strong and by weak arguments. When Ss encoded the message in a neutral mood, 
however, the advantage of strong over weak arguments was more pronounced when Ss were in a 
good rather than in a bad mood at the time ofattitude assessment. In Experiment 2, Ss exposed to a 
counterattitudinal message composed of either strong or weak arguments formed either a global 
evaluation or a detailed representation of the message. Positive, negative, or neutral mood was then 
induced. Ss in a good mood were most likely and Ss in a negative mood least likely to base their 
reported attitudes on global evaluations.
Judgments:
After Message Elaboration
Diane M. Mackie 
University o f California, Santa Barbara
Using a range o f different mood inductions and persuasive 
messages about a variety o f  attitudinal issues, recent studies 
have consistently found that recipients’ processing o f  persua­
sive communications depends on their affective state. Whereas 
people in neutral or negative moods are differentially affected 
by the quality o f persuasive messages and report more favorable 
attitudes after exposure to strong rather than weak arguments, 
recipients in a good mood are as persuaded by weak as strong 
arguments. Moreover, cognitive responses to persuasive mes­
sages reflect the quality o f  the presented arguments when peo­
ple are in neutral or bad moods, but not when they are in good 
moods (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Innes & 
Ahrens, 1991; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987; 
for an overview see Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991).
These findings are consistent with recent models o f mood 
effects on processing style that suggest that individuals in posi­
tive affective states tend to simplify processing tasks (for re­
views see Fiedler, 1988; Isen, 1987; Schwarz, 1990). That recipi­
ents in a good mood are equally persuaded by strong and by
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weak arguments has accordingly been interpreted as indicating 
that these recipients are less likely to engage in “systematic” 
(Chaiken, 1980, 1987) or “central route” processing (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981, 1986; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976) o f  the con­
tent o f persuasive messages. Because they appear not to elabo­
rate the content o f a message extensively, recipients in a good 
mood are more likely to be influenced by the use o f simplifying 
cognitive strategies to assess message validity. This conclusion 
is supported by the finding that attitudes o f subjects in a posi­
tive but not a neutral mood reflect the presence o f heuristic 
cues (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987). More­
over, increasing the amount o f elaboration by providing addi­
tional time for processing eliminates the typical effect o f posi­
tive mood (Mackie & Worth, 1989), and experimentally de­
creasing the amount o f elaboration by introducing a distracter 
task produces identical attitude judgments in subjects in both 
positive and negative moods (Bless et al., 1990, Experiment 2).
Although the impact o f mood has been attributed to its im­
pact on encoding in all o f the previously mentioned studies, it 
remains unclear whether mood at encoding constitutes a suffi­
cient condition for the observed effects. In all studies, mood 
was induced immediately before a rather short message was 
presented and attitudes were assessed as soon as the presenta­
tion was completed. Thus, recipients could have been in the 
same affective state both when they encoded the message and 
when they reported their attitude judgment. Accordingly, recipi­
ents’ mood at the time o f encoding and at the time o f  attitude 
assessment may have been confounded in this research. Experi­
ment 1 was designed first to investigate the crucial role o f mood 
at encoding independent o f mood at assessment, and second to 
explore possible mood effects that may occur after the message 
has been encoded.
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Experim ent 1
If the previously obtained findings reflect only the impact of 
mood at encoding, the pattern of effects typically found should 
again be obtained when mood is induced at elaboration but 
allowed to dissipate before attitude assessment. That is, recipi­
ents who encode the message in a negative mood should report 
more favorable attitudes after exposure to strong as compared 
with weak arguments, whereas recipients who encode the 
message in a positive mood should be unaffected by argument 
quality.
How might recipients’ mood influence attitude judgments 
made about material cncoded before an affective state was in­
duced? Given that sufficient message elaboration occurs during 
encoding, various strategies might be used when attitude judg­
ments are later required. Moreover, different strategies might 
be preferred by individuals in different mood states.
Suppose that while encoding the message in a nonaffective 
state recipients spontaneously form an attitude judgment that 
reflects the differential impact o f  strong versus weak argu­
ments. If so, they may simply retrieve this previously formed 
judgment when later asked to report their attitude (Lingle & 
Ostrom, 1981), If this is the case, the attitudes o f subjects in 
both positive and negative moods should equally reflect argu­
ment quality.
Often, however, a particular judgment may not be formed 
during encoding because other processing objectives are re­
quired (Hastie & Park, 1986; Mackie & Asuncion, 1990), or it 
may not be easily accessible in memory. In such circumstances 
subjects have to recall attitude relevant information to compute 
the required judgment. At least three types o f information 
could be retrieved.
First, subjects may try to recall as much relevant information 
as possible. Given the retrieval advantage o f internally gener­
ated material (Slamecka & Graf, 1978) the most accessible mate­
rial may well be the cognitive responses generated in response 
to processing the message (Greenwald, 1968; Love & Green- 
wald, 1978), For all intents and purposes, this retrieval strategy 
simulates elaboration during message presentation, and atti­
tudes should thus reflect the quality o f the arguments. Because 
subjects in a good mood attempt to simplify processing, they 
are less likely to engage in this effort than subjects in a bad or 
neutral mood. Accordingly, the differential impact of strong 
versus weak arguments should be stronger for subjects in a bad 
mood rather than a good mood, paralleling the effects o f mood 
at encoding.
Second, instead o f an effortful recall o f reactions to message 
content, subjects could simply retrieve characterizations of the 
message that represented some kind o f  summary of the pro­
vided information. This might be a global evaluation o f the 
message as weak or strong, unaccompanied by information 
about particular arguments or responses (that may or may not 
have been stored simultaneously during encoding, Ebbesen,
1980,1981; Wyer & Srull, 1989). As judgments based on simple 
structures have been demonstrated to be more extreme than 
judgments based on more complex knowledge structures (Lin- 
ville, 1982; Linville & Jones, 1980; Judd & Lusk, 1984) this 
strategy should result in judgments that clearly differentiate 
between messages comprising strong versus weak arguments.
As this strategy seems to simplify cognitive processing, it 
should especially be preferred by subjects in positive moods. If 
so, the impact o f argument quality may be more pronounced 
when subjects are in a good rather than a bad mood at the time 
o f attitude assessment, reversing the previously obtained im­
pact o f mood at encoding.
A third possibility is that subjects attempt to retrieve infor­
mation from the message or their reaction to it but that this 
process is influenced by their current mood state (Forgas & 
Bower, 1987; Srull, 1983). This would give a retrieval advantage 
to mood-congruent material, suggesting that subjects in a posi­
tive mood would retrieve predominantly favorable information 
and thus be persuaded, whereas subjects in a negative mood 
would retrieve predominantly unfavorable material and show 
no attitude change.
Finally, individuals may make the judgment by consulting 
their own affective state according to a “how-do-I-feel-about- 
it?” heuristic (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988). One’s subjective 
affective state may thus be used (either appropriately or inappro­
priately) as a heuristic cue. If individuals in a good mood are 
more likely to use such a heuristic, their judgments should be 
more positive than judgments o f individuals in a bad mood, 
regardless o f argument quality. In summary, the first two recall- 
based hypotheses predict interaction effects o f mood and argu­
ment quality, whereas the last two hypotheses predict a main 
effect o f mood.
Method
Subjects and Design
Seventy-six University of Heidelberg students received DM10 (ap­
proximately Î5 at the time of the experiment) for their participation. 
Subjects were run in groups of 3 to 6 and were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of a 2 (positive or negative mood) x 2 (strong or weak argu­
ments) X 2 (mood induced at encoding or at judgment) factorial desig n.
Procedure
Subjects were informed that they would be completing several dif­
ferent and independent tasks and that they would be asked some ques­
tions about each of the completed tasks. It was emphasized that these 
tasks al 1 involved pretesting language materials for use in other studies. 
These tasks (described later) included (a) the mood induction, (b) the 
presentation of the persuasive message, (c) a neutral filler task, and (d) 
the assessment of dependent variables. The order in which the mood 
induction task and the filler task was presented was counterbalanced 
(as described later) to induce positive or negative mood either before 
message encoding or before the assessment o f attitudes. Most of the 
experimental manipulations of Experiment 1 had been used success­
fully in two earlier experiments (Bless et al, 1990).
Mood induction. In th is task, subjects were asked to provide a vivid 
and detailed written report of eitherahappyorasadlifeevent, purport­
edly to help with the construction of a “Heidelberg Life Event Inven­
tory;’ Reporting a happy event was intended to induce positive mood, 
whereas focusing on an experienced sad event was intended to induce 
negative mood (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Strack, Schwarz, & Gschnei- 
dinger, 1985). Subjects were given 15 min for their report and were then 
asked several questions about the task. Embedded among these ques­
tions was a manipulation check that read, “How do you feel right 
now?" (1 = very bad and 11 = very good).
Presentation o f persuasive message and manipulation o f argument
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quality. Subjects were told that this task was concerned with language 
comprehension and with pretesting the comprehensibility ofa particu­
lar text. Subjects listened to a tape-recorded communication that an­
nounced an increase in student services fees from DM45 to DM65 per 
semester (an increase of approximately $10) slated to take effect at the 
beginning of the next academic year at the University of Heidelberg.' 
The fee increase was justified in the communication with either 11 
strong or 11 weak arguments. Differences in the quality of these sets of 
arguments had been convincingly demonstrated in previous studies 
(Bless el al., 1990). Both messages were of approximately equal length.
After listening to the message, subjects answered several questions 
about the presentation of the message (e.g., how acoustically clear the 
speaker was, how appropriate the speaker’s style ofspeaking was, how 
easy or difficult the language used in the text was to understand, and 
how well they could concentrate on the text). None of these questions 
referred to the quality or content of the message.
The cover story that various texts were being pretested, the intro­
duction of this particular task as concerning language comprehension, 
and the selection of questions that focused on various linguistic 
aspects of the message were all designed to reduce the likelihood that 
subjects would form attitudinal judgments during encoding of the 
message. As in previous research, the presentation of alternative pro­
cessing goals during encoding and judgment was designed to inhibit 
on-line attitude formation (Hastie & Park, 1986; Lichtenstein & Srull, 
1987; Mackie & Asuncion, 1990).
Neutral filler task. This task required subjects to read a text about a 
man having dinner at a restaurant and to reproduce this story. The 
content of this filler task was unrelated to the content of the persuasive 
message and did not include any statements potentially eliciting a posi­
tive or a negative mood stale. Subjects were given 15 min to complete 
this task.
After completing the filler lask, subjects were asked several ques­
tions, one of which again served to assess mood. Subjects responded to 
the item “How do you feel now?" by checking the same scale used to 
assess the mood manipulation.
The neutral filler task had two purposes. First, it was intended to 
ensure the return of subjects to a relatively neutral mood state. Thus, in 
the case in which ihe filler task followed the mood manipulation and 
the presentation of the persuasive message, it was designed to ensure 
that any mood effects present during message encoding were no longer 
present when attitude judgments were reported during the dependent 
measure task. When the filler lask preceded message presentation il 
ensured that subjects were all in a relatively uniformly neutral mood at 
message presentation, regardless of their mood state on entering the 
experiment. The filler task also served to equate the passage of time 
spent on the mood induction task so that regardless of order condition, 
15 min elapsed between presentation of the persuasive communica­
tion and the assessment of the dependent measures.
Induction o f mood before or after message presentation. The order in 
which the mood induction task and the filler task was presented was 
counterbalanced. For half the subjects the mood induction immedi­
ately preceded the presentation of the message and the filler task fol­
lowed message presentation. In this condition, induced mood was in­
tended to be présentât encoding of the persuasive message but to have 
dissipated before the dependent measures were assessed. For the other 
half of the subjects, the filler task preceded message presentation, and 
the mood induction followed the message but immediately preceded 
assessment of the dependent variables. In this condition, it was in­
tended that mood effects would not be present during encoding but 
would be present during the assessment of dependent measures.
Dependent Measures
Attitude judgment. Before answering other questions subjects ind i- 
cated their approval of the anticipated increase in student fees by
checking a 9-point rating scale where 1 indicated strongly disapprove 
and 9, strongly approve.
Cognitive responses. Subjects were then given 3 min in which to list 
“all thoughts that came to mind while listening to the tape recording.” 
Subjects were provided with a sheet of paper divided into 10 boxes and 
were instructed to list only one thought per box. Subjects were not 
required to use all the boxes. After completing the thought listing, 
subjects indicated whether each thought they had listed was favorable 
(supportive of the proposed fee increase), unfavorable (opposed to the 
increase), or neutral (unrelated to the issue).
Recall of message content. Finally, in a surprise recall test, subjects 
were given 3 min in which to write down any and all the presented 
arguments they could remember.
Results 
Effectiveness of Mood Manipulations
Responses to the items assessing subjects’ mood before mes­
sage presentation and before attitude assessment were analyzed 
by two analyses o f variance (ANOYAs).
Mood at encoding. Subjects’ self reports o f  subjective state 
immediately before being exposed to the persuasive communi­
cation revealed a significant main effect for mood, F(2, 6 1)2 =
6.55, p  < .003, as expected. Subjects who had described a posi­
tive life event reported being in a better mood (M  = 7.8) than 
both subjects who had described a negative life event (M  = 5.9), 
/(6l) = 3.61, p  <  .0005, and subjects who had worked on the 
filler task (M  = 7.1), ¿(61 ) = 1.70, p < .05. In addition, subjects 
who had described a negative life event reported being sadder 
than subjects who had worked on the filler task, ¿(61) = -2 .32 , 
p  < .02 (all comparisons one-tailed). Thus, mood was success­
fully manipulated before presentation o f  the persuasive commu­
nication.
Mood at assessment o f  attitudes. The responses o f subjects 
who had described life events immediately before assessment of  
the dependent measures also revealed a main effect for induced 
mood, F(2,72) = 7.33, p  <  .002. Those who described a positive 
life event reported being in a better mood (M =  8.7) than both 
subjects who had described a negative life event (M  = 6.3), 
/(72) = 3.73, p < .0005, and subjects who had worked on the 
filler task {M  =7.1), ¿(72) = 2.86, p < .003. In addition, subjects 
who had worked on the filler task reported marginally better 
mood than subjects who had described a negative life event, 
r(75) = -1 .46 , p < .08 (all comparisons one-tailed). Mood had 
thus been successfully induced immediately before assessment 
of the dependent measures. In addition, the comparisons with 
reports from subjects completing the neutral filler task indi­
cated that the effects o f  mood induced before message presenta­
tion had dissipated before attitude assessment, as intended.
1 Although an increase of DM20 may seem slight, it should be noted 
thal the last actual fee increase of DM11 in 1982 caused massive stu­
dent protests. The proposed increase was thus clearly counterattitu- 
dinal for the subjects.
2 Eleven subjects in the mood at judgment condition did not fully 
complete the neutral filler task before message presentation. The re­
sponses of these subjects did not differ from those of other subjects in 
this condition on any dependent variable (all ps > .20) and were in­
cluded in the analysis.
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Attitude Change
The influence o f the persuasive communication was inferred 
from recipients’ approval o f the suggested fee increase. Mean 
approval scores appear in Table 1 as a function of induced 
mood, timing o f mood induction, and argument quality.
The extent to which subjects agreed with the advocated in­
crease was analyzed in a 2 (mood) X 2 (timing of mood induc­
tion) X 2 (argument quality) between-subjects ANOVA. Subjects 
reported greater approval o f the fee increase after hearing 
strong {M -  4.16) as compared with weak (M  = 2.28) argu­
ments, jFO, 68) = 22.75, p < .005. As predicted, however, this 
differential effect o f argument quality was affected by both the 
induced mood and the timing o f  the mood induction, as re­
vealed by a significant three-way interaction involving these 
factors, jF(1 , 68) -  6.94, p  < .02. To clarify these effects, further 
analyses were performed to investigate the independent effects 
of mood at the time o f encoding and at the time o f judgment.
M ood at encoding. A simple effects analysis revealed a main 
effect o f message quality, F fl, 68) = 3.95, p  < .05, qualified by a 
marginally significant interaction between the valence o f the 
mood induced before message presentation and the quality of 
arguments presented in the message, jp(l, 68) = 3.29, p  < ,07. 
Specifically, strong arguments were more influential than weak 
arguments when subjects were in a bad mood at the time of 
encoding o f the message, /(68) = 2.68, p  < .009, but argument 
quality had no impact when subjects were in a good mood at 
that time (t <  1). Thus, when mood was induced at encoding 
and had dissipated by the time judgments were reported, the 
pattern o f results replicated previous findings (Bless et a l, 1990; 
Mackie & Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987). This finding 
demonstrates that recipients’ mood at encoding is sufficient to 
produce the previously reported effects, given that the induced 
mood states had dissipated by the time o f the attitude report.
Mood at assessment o f  attitude judgment. When mood was 
manipulated immediately before attitude judgments were as­
sessed, strong arguments produced more approval than weak 
arguments for all subjects (M  -  4.5 vs. M  -  2,0), F(l, 68) =
21.76, p  < .001, for the simple main effect However, this effect 
was even more pronounced for subjects in a good mood (M ~
5.2 and M  -  1.6 for strong and weak arguments, respectively), 
r(68) = 4.65, p  <  .0005, than for subjects in a bad mood (M=  3.8 
and M  -  2.3 for strong and weak arguments, respectively), 
/(68) = 1.95, p  <  .06. This pattern is reflected in a marginally 
significant simple interaction, F{\, 68) = 3.67, p <  .06, indicat­
ing that mood induction at the time o f judgment was also capa­
ble of influencing persuasion outcomes.
Cognitive Responses and Message Recall
The proportion o f favorable and unfavorable thoughts in re­
sponse to strong and weak arguments during encoding was in­
fluenced by the nature and timing o f the induced mood stale. 
Overall, subjects reported a higher proportion of favorable 
thoughts in response to strong than to weak arguments 
(M  = 0.29 vs. 0.13), F(I, 68) = 11.40, p  < .001, and a lower 
proportion of unfavorable thoughts (M  = 0.38 vs. 0.57), F(l, 
68)=  10.86, p < . 002.
More important, however, these main effects were qualified
Table 1
Attitude Change as a Function o f  Mood, Timing o f  Mood
Induction, and Argument Quality (.Experiment 1)
Timing of mood induction
Mood before Mood before
encoding judgment
Argument type Positive Negative Positive Negative
Strong 3.6 4.1 5.2 3.8
Weak 3.4 1.9 1.6 2.3
Note. The possible range of values for approval was 1 {strongly disap­
prove) to 9 (strongly approve).
by the impact o f both induced mood and the timing o f the 
mood induction, indicated by marginal interaction effects for 
both favorable responses, F(1,68) = 3.59, p  < .07, and unfavor­
able responses, .F(l, 68) = 2.59, p  < .12. Replicating previous 
research, strong arguments elicited a higher proportion o f favor­
able and a smaller proportion o f  unfavorable thoughts than 
weak arguments when subjects were in a negative (Bless et al., 
1990) or a neutral mood (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Worth & 
Mackie, 1987) but not when subjects were in a good mood while 
encoding the message.3,4
Discussion
The present results demonstrate that recipients’ mood state 
can affect attitude judgments either by influencing the encod­
ing of the message or by influencing processes independent o f  
initial message elaboration. In contrast with all other subjects, 
subjects in a good mood during message encoding did not show 
differential attitude change nor differentia) cognitive responses 
to messages containing strong or weak arguments. This finding 
adds further support to the idea that recipients in a good mood 
simplify processing by reducing the amount o f  message elabora­
tion (for an overview see Schwarz et al., 1991). More important, 
the results extend previous findings in two ways. First, given 
that the induced mood state had dissipated by the time atti­
tudes were reported, the findings indicate recipients’ mood at 
encoding is by itself sufficient to produce the previously re-
3 Specifically, subjects in a negative mood reported a higher propor­
tion of favorable thoughts and a lower proportion of unfavorable after 
strong than after weak arguments (M= 0.33 vs. M  = 0.07 and M  = 0.35 
vs. M  -  0,54), ¿(68) = 2.57, p < .02, and <(68) = -1.49, ns. These 
differences were not obtained for subjects who were in a good mood 
during message exposure (M= 0.19 vs. M=  0.24 and M= 0.46 vs. M = 
0.53), both ts < 1. Subjects in a neutral mood while encoding, that is, 
those for whom mood was induced after encoding, reported a higher 
proportion of favorable thoughts and a lower proportion of unfavor­
able after strong than after weak arguments (M = 0.32 vs. M  -  0.11 and 
M =  0.35 vs. M  = 0.60), /(68) = 3.23, p  < .01, and f(68) = 3.17 p < .01.
* Subjects’ recall of the presented arguments was unaffected by their 
affective stale. Overall, strong arguments were better recalled (M = 
7.2) than weak arguments(M = 6.1), F(l, 68)= 20.45, p < .005, but no 
other effects of the variables on total recall were found, again parallel­
ing previous findings (Bless et al., 1990).
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ported effects o f positive mood on persuasive processing. Sec­
ond, the present results also suggest that happy recipients can­
not later compensate for their lack o f message elaboration, even 
if  the attitude judgment is required when the initial affective 
state has dissipated.
The impact o f induced mood was not restricted to the encod­
ing stage, however. When a positive or negative mood was in­
duced after subjects had encoded the message in a neutral 
mood, the advantage o f strong over weak arguments was more 
pronounced for subjects in a good mood. This occurred despite 
the fact that subjects’ recall o f and cognitive responses to mes­
sage content were not affected by postmessage mood induc­
tions, indicating that all subjects had encoded and elaborated 
the message to the same degree, as intended. Our results thus 
indicate that moods may affect judgmental processes, and 
hence the effectiveness o f persuasive communications, even if 
they are induced after the persuasive message has been en­
coded.
The pattern o f  attitude outcomes we obtained under these 
conditions allowed us to eliminate several processing pathways 
by which affect induced at judgment could have had its effects. 
First, the fact that mood effects were obtained eliminates the 
possibility that subjects had formed attitudes on-line and were 
merely reporting those previously formed judgments. If this 
had been the case, there would have been no evidence o f  mood 
effects on outcomes, as all subjects processed the message in a 
neutral mood. This finding confirms the effectiveness o f  the 
technique o f presenting subjects with other processing goals for 
inhibiting on-line judgments (Hastie & Park, 1986; Lichten­
stein & Srull, 1987; Mackie & Asuncion, 1990). Second, the 
obtained pattern eliminated the possibility that subjects re­
trieved cognitive responses previously elicited by the message 
to simulate on-line elaboration. Again, if this were the case, all 
subjects should have produced similar judgments, as all sub­
jects encoded the message under identical conditions. Finally, 
the failure to find a main effect that reflected greater persua­
sion in the positive mood condition eliminated two other possi­
bilities. Both biased retrieval o f  mood-congruent responses or 
reliance on the how-do-I-feel-about-it? heuristic would have 
produced such a pattern. Thus, it appears that neither o f these 
possibilities can explain the impact that mood induced before 
judgment had on attitudinal outcomes.
In summary, the impact o f induced mood state produced 
diametrically opposed patterns depending on when mood was 
induced: The differential impact o f strong versus weak argu­
ments was decreased when positive mood was induced before 
message presentation, whereas it was increased when positive 
mood was induced after message presentation but before the 
assessment o f attitude judgments. We propose that both effects 
are due to subjects’ tendency to reduce cognitive effort while 
being in a good mood. When mood is induced before exposure 
to the message, good mood results in reduced elaboration o f  
message content. When mood is induced after message encod­
ing but before attitude assessment, it presumably affects what 
information subjects use in making a judgment. Specifically, 
our findings suggest that although subjects who encoded the 
message in a neutral mood had similar representations o f  the 
message available, subjects in different mood conditions based 
their judgment on different aspects o f this representation. The
obtained pattern suggested that the impact o f positive mood 
was to rely on some representation that further strengthened 
the impact o f argument quality, yet did not involve mood-spe­
cific retrieval o f arguments from or reactions to the message. 
Thus, in the second experiment we turned our attention to 
investigating what representations o f  message content formed 
during encoding may have been used by subjects in a positive 
mood at judgment to produce the obtained effects.
Experiment 2
Unfortunately, previous research has had little to say about 
how persuasive messages are represented in memory or about 
the way in which retrieval o f  different types o f information can 
influence attitude judgments. Relevant hypotheses can be de­
rived, however, from research in other domains (Hastie, Park, 
& Weber, 1984; Wyer & Gordon, 1984; Wyer & Srull, 1989). 
There is increasing agreement across models that representa­
tion of social information may simultaneously contain both 
global and specific information. For example, Ebbesen (1980, 
1981) and Wyer and Srull (1989) have argued that both global 
impressions o f and individual behaviors performed by target 
persons may be stored during encoding and that either can be 
used as the basis for judgments. Using these assumptions as a 
parallel, we suggest that representations o f attitude-relevant in­
formation in a persuasive message could include global evalua­
tions (e.g-, “This was pretty convincing.”) or more detailed infor­
mation (such as presented arguments, cognitive responses to 
them, and other details o f the persuasive context), or both. If so, 
attitude judgments might be based on different representations 
o f the same message. Moreover, subjects’ processing strategy 
may determine which representation is used, which in turn 
may determine the resulting attitude judgment.
In many situations in which on-line attitude change occurs, it 
is likely that one o f  the global judgments formed and encoded is 
an attitude judgment, either a new judgment or a modification 
o f a previously held opinion. The encoding conditions we in­
duced, however, inhibited the formation o f on-line attitudes (as 
indicated by the results o f Experiment 1 ). What global represen­
tations of the message might have been formed spontaneously 
in this case? Given that we explicitly directed subjects to the 
nature of the language used in the message, it is likely that 
global evaluations o f the language and arguments as strong and 
powerful (“Those were pretty good arguments”) or weak and 
specious (“Those arguments were pathetic.”) may well have 
been formed.5 Thus, such summary evaluations—as well as 
specific arguments and cognitive responses— might have been 
stored after encoding and may have been available for later use 
in making an attitude judgment.
What, however, would be the effect o f retrieving global repre­
sentations o f  a persuasive message? In fact, reliance on global 
evaluations might produce judgments that are more extreme
i The formation of a global evaluation of the message (“it was a 
strong message” or “there wasn't much to support the position”) does 
not entail the formation of an attitude judgment about the issue, as 
evidenced by the independence of perceptions of the quality of argu­
ments and their effects on attitude change (Bless et al., 1990; Mackie & 
Worth, 1989).
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than those based on careful processing o f details of the mes­
sage. Evidence for this assumption is provided by findings sug­
gesting that judgments are more likely to be extreme if they are 
based on simple knowledge structures and schemata rather 
than on more complex knowledge structures (Judd & Lusk, 
1984; Linville, 1982; Linville & Jones, 1980). It is argued that 
relying on simple representations decreases the number of dif­
ferent dimensions used in the judgment. Thus, it becomes 
more likely that moderating or inconsistent information is 
omitted. By the same argument, complex representations in­
cluding multiple dimensions increase the likelihood o f moder­
ate, less extreme judgments. In the persuasive context, then, 
reliance on retrieval o f the message's content would produce a 
main effect for argument quality. However, not all arguments 
may appear equally strong or weak to all recipients. To the 
extent that recipients rely on global evaluations, these (partially 
idiosyncratic) differences in the strength o f individual argu­
ments may be missed. As a result, the use o f  global evaluations 
may accentuate differences between messages, resulting in sig­
nificantly stronger effects o f overall argument quality in atti­
tude judgments.
At least two factors may influence which type of message 
representation will be used in making attitudinal judgments. 
First, a representation is more likely to be used if its accessibil­
ity is increased (Wyer & Srull, 1989). For example, any represen­
tation that has been recently formed, used, or activated in some 
way is more likely to provide the basis for a judgment than is 
less accessible material.
Second, the use o f different representations may depend on 
the degree to which the perceiver chooses to or is able to allo­
cate resources to the judgment process. Retrieving the numer­
ous detailed and specific arguments and thoughts elicited by 
the message content requires a considerable amount o f process­
ing. Not only must repeated retrieval be sustained, but the inde­
pendent pieces o f  retrieved information need to be combined. 
In contrast, an already existing global evaluation can serve as a 
single cue on which attitude judgments are made. Thus, global 
evaluations may have more impact when other variables de­
crease the amount o f processing. In contrast, variables that 
increase the amount o f processing should make it more likely 
that thoughts elicited by the message will be reconsidered.
These considerations provide a tentative explanation for the 
results obtained in our first experiment. As noted earlier, pre­
vious evidence suggests that individuals in a positive mood 
tend to simplify their processing and rely on the use o f simple 
heuristics (Fiedler, 1988; Isen, 1987; Schwarz, 1990). If so, little 
attention may be allocated to judgment processes (just as posi­
tive mood at encoding results in reduced elaboration), and 
happy subjects should be more likely to use a global evaluation 
as a heuristic cue to an appropriate attitude judgment. This in 
turn would result in more extreme judgments. The use o f global 
evaluations as a basis for making later attitude judgments thus 
provides a possible explanation o f  the increased impact o f mes­
sage quality found under the elated mood at judgment condi­
tions o f Experiment 1.
The mediating role o f reliance on different message represen­
tations as a possible explanation o f our findings was tested 
more directly in Experiment 2. In addition to manipulating 
induced mood and the strength o f presented arguments, we
manipulated the accessibility o f different message representa­
tions. This was accomplished by requiring subjects either to 
judge the message as a whole on the dimension o f quality or to 
consider the multiple and different arguments comprising the 
message. Whereas the former task should result in a global 
evaluative representation o f the message, the latter task should 
result in a more detailed representation. In the neutral mood 
condition, we expected subjects to rely more on the detailed or 
on the global representation, depending on which one was ren­
dered more accessible by the preceding task. Thus, we expected 
to see an effect for argument quality when the detailed represen­
tation was accessible and an even greater effect o f  message qual­
ity when global evaluations were accessible.
The accessibility of different representations was expected to 
have different effects in the affective conditions, however. The 
accessibility o f a global evaluation absolves subjects in a positive 
mood from doing extensive processing; thus, they are likely to 
rely heavily on it and we expected a strong effect for message 
quality in this condition. If a global evaluation is not easily 
accessible, however, attitude judgments can only be based on 
the more difficult recall and integration o f the arguments and 
thoughts stored in the detailed representation. As individuals 
in a good mood are less likely to engage in this effortful process, 
their attitudes should not reflect message quality when the de­
tailed representation is most accessible.
In contrast, ifindividuals in negative affective states are more 
likely to engage in a more systematic and effortful processing 
(Fiedler, 1988; Schwarz, 1990), they should engage in a thor­
ough recall o f all information they can remember. Thus, the 
absence or presence o f  an easily accessible global evaluation 
should have little impact on their attitude judgments, which 
should reflect argument quality independently o f the type of 
representation formed.
Based on these considerations, we made the following pre­
dictions. When a global evaluation was accessible, we expected 
it to be used by subjects in a good and in a neutral mood, but 
not by subjects in a bad mood. Thus, we expected attitude judg­
ments o f subjects in a good or a neutral mood to reflect the 
overall quality o f the arguments more strongly than attitude 
judgments o f  subjects in a bad mood. In contrast, when a de­
tailed representation o f the message was made easily accessible, 
we expected subjects in a neutral and a bad mood, but not 
subjects in a good mood, to use recalled details in computing 
an attitude judgment. Accordingly, attitude judgments o f sub­
jects in a bad and a neutral mood, but not o f  subjects in a good 
mood, should reflect message quality under this condition.
Method 
Subjects and Design
One hundred eighty-one introductory psychology students al the 
University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB), received partial 
credit for their participation. Subjects were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of a 3 (positive, neutral, or negative mood at the time of 
judgment) X  2 (strong or weak arguments) X  2 (global evaluation or 
detailed representation) factorial design. Subjects were run in groups 
of 3 to 6.
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Procedure
Subjects assembled in a reception room and were lotd that they 
would be asked to complete a number of unrelated tasks. These tasks 
included the viewing and evaluation of materials presented both by 
video and on a computer screen. Subjects were seated individually in 
visually isolated computer booths. Each booth contained an IBM PC- 
XT, which presented further instructions and stimulus materials rele­
vant to the first task.
Message presentation and manipulation o f argument quality. Sub­
jects read that the first task concerned language comprehension. They 
then initiated presentation of a persuasive message advocating contin­
ued oil drilling off the southwestern coast of the United States (a posi­
tion that pretesting had established as counterattitudinal for the major­
ity of UCSB students). The position taken in the message appeared 
first and was followed by a series of arguments, each of which was 
presented individually for a fixed amount of time. Half of the subjects 
saw arguments that pretesting had demonstrated to be strong (M = 
11.2, wherel5= very strong). The other half saw arguments pretested as 
weak (M  = 7.3), /"(1,13) = 40.84, p < ,0001. The two versions of the 
message were approximately equal in length.
Manipulation o f message representation. After reading the message, 
subjects were asked to answer four questions, ostensibly assessing lan­
guage comprehension. Only the last of these questions in fact referred 
to the content of the message, and this question was designed to induce 
subjects to form either a global evaluation or to think about the details 
of the message content. Half the subjects were asked to think about 
“the strength of the arguments you saw” and to rate the strength or 
weakness of the arguments using a 9-point rating scale where 9 indi­
cated very strong. This question was intended to have subjects form a 
global evaluation related only to the strength of the arguments con­
tained in the message. The other half of the subjects were asked to 
think about the different arguments presented in the message and to 
indicate how many different arguments had been presented. This ques­
tion was designed to make subjects think about the different content of 
the various arguments presented and thus to consider several different 
aspects of message content.6 Both responses to these questions and 
response times were recorded.
After answering the other questions (which concerned, for example, 
how easy or difficult the passage was to understand, whether there was 
adequate time in which to read it, and whethersubjects would prefer to 
see the message all at once or sentence by sentence), subjects were 
asked to leave their computer booth and return to the reception room.
Mood induction. Subjects were met by a new experimenter who 
explained that he or she was pretesting brief video clips for use in a 
future study. Subjects were asked to watch one clip and answer some 
questions about it. Subjects in whom a positive mood was to be in­
duced watched a 5-min comedy segment taken from the television 
program “Saturday Night Live.” Subjects in the neutral mood condi­
tion watched a 5-min segment about winecorking. Subjects in whom 
negative mood was to be induced watched a S-min segment about a 
summer camp for children with cancer. After watching the video, sub­
jects were asked several questions, among them an item that served asa 
check on the effectiveness of the mood manipulations. Subjects re­
sponded to the question “How do you feel now?” by checkinga 9-point 
rating scale ranging from 1 (sad) to 9 (happy). After completing the 
video rating task, subjects returned to their computerbooths to answer 
some final questions about the language comprehension task.
Dependent Measures
Attitude judgments. Subjects were first asked to indicate their 
agreement with the statement that “offshore oil drilling in the south­
western United States should be continued.” Subjects responded by
marking a 9-point scale on which 1 = strongly disagree and 9 = strongly 
agree. Responses and response latencies were recorded.
Judgment-related thought listing. Subjects were then given a sheet of 
paper divided into response spaces and headed with instructions to 
write down all thoughts they had “while they were thinking about 
their answer” on the oil drilling issue. Subjects were assured they did 
not have to fill all the provided response spaces, and they were re­
quested to record only those thoughts they had while actually making 
the judgment.
Finally, subjects responded to five questions, again presented on the 
computer. Subjects were asked whether their attitude response was 
based more on the content o f the message or more on prior knowledge, 
whether it was based on an overall evaluation or on some specific 
arguments, how sure they were of their position, how important the 
issue was to them, and, finally, how persuasive they had found the 
message to be. Responses were all made on 9-point scales, and re­
sponses and response latencies were automatically recorded.
Results and Discussion 
Effectiveness of Manipulations
Subjects’ ratings o f how happy or sad they felt immediately 
before assessment o f the attitude judgment were analyzed in a 3 
(positive, neutral, or negative mood) X  2 (strong or weak argu­
ments) X  2 (global or detailed information easily accessible) 
ANOVA. This revealed a significant main effect o f the mood 
manipulation, F(2,169) =  76.59, p  < .0005. Subjects who had 
watched the comedy segment reported feeling happier {M  =
7.21) than both subjects who watched the wine segment (M  =
6.02), i(l69) = 4.62, p  < .0005, and subjects who had watched 
the segment about children with cancer (M  = 4.05), /(169) =
12.30, p  <  .0005. Moreover, subjects who had watched the seg­
ment on children with cancer reported feeling less happy than 
subjects who had watched the wine segment, /(169) = 7.5, p < 
.0005.
In addition, subjects asked to form a global evaluation by 
judging the quality of presented arguments rated the strong 
arguments as stronger (M  = 6.26) than the weak arguments 
(.M =  4,09), F(l, 85) = 34.31, p  < .0005, paralleling the pretest 
data. No other significant main effects or interactions were ob­
tained. Furthermore, all subjects rated strong arguments as 
more persuasive (M  -  5.69) than weak arguments (M = 3.52), 
F{2,164) = 55.40, p  <  .001 (all other ps >  .10), in response to 
the last question o f the experiment.
Subjects who were asked for the number o f  different argu­
ments o f the message estimated the message to comprise an 
average o f 4.32 arguments. No significant main effects or inter­
actions were found on this measure.
The time subjects needed to answer these questions was ana­
lyzed in a 3 (positive, neutral, or negative mood) X  2 (strong or 
weak arguments) X 2 (global evaluation or detail information) 
ANOVA, As intended, it took subjects longer to respond to the 
question about the number o f  different arguments in the mes­
sage (M  = 15.11) than to question about overall message
6 Note that emphasizing different made it more likely that subjects 
were thinking of uncorrelated than of correlated arguments, which 
seems an important mediator between complexity of representations 
and extremity of judgments (Judd & Lusk, 1984).
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strength (M  = 8.89), F(2,169) = 38.02, p  < .0005. There were no 
other effects.
Agreement With the Advocated Position
The primary analysis o f subjects’ reported agreement with 
the position advocated by the counterattitudinal message con­
sisted o f the planned contrast testing the differential impact o f 
strong compared with weak arguments according to the hypoth­
eses outlined earlier. If a global evaluation was not easily accessi­
ble, we expected to replicate consistent findings for the encod­
ing o f persuasive messages: a differential impact of strong ver­
sus weak arguments for subjects in a bad or a neutral mood, but 
not for subjects in a good mood. If a global evaluation was 
available, judgments of all subjects were expected to reflect 
message quality; however, this effect was expected to be more 
pronounced for subjects in a good or neutral mood than for 
subjects in a bad mood. The contrast weights used in the 
planned comparison and the means for agreement with the 
advocated position appear in Table 2.
The results o f the planned contrast confirmed the predic­
tion, producing the expected significant interaction, i(169) =
2.10, p  <  .04. As the means in Table 2 show, the differential 
impact o f strong and weak arguments was dramatically pro­
nounced for subjects in a positive mood in the global evaluation 
condition. Subjects in a neutral mood also appeared to rely on 
the global evaluation when it was easily accessible, being more 
influenced by it than were the negative mood subjects. When 
different aspects o f  the message content were made available in 
the detailed representation condition, the differential impact 
of strong and weak arguments was more pronounced for the 
neutral and negative mood subjects than for the happy subjects.
In combination, this pattern o f findings indicates that sub­
jects in a neutral mood used the representation that was most 
accessible at the time of judgment, producing a more pro­
nounced impact o f argument quality when they were induced 
to form a global rather than a detailed representation of the 
message. In contrast, subjects in a good mood relied on a global 
representation if  easily acccssible but did not make use of a 
detailed representation, resulting in the absence of an impact of 
argument quality under the latter condition. Thus, when global 
evaluations were not accessible to happy subjects the results 
paralleled the previously obtained effects o f mood on message 
elaboration. This finding also strengthens our conclusion that 
the attitude judgments reported here were not made during 
encoding and merely retrieved. Although finding effects for the 
impact o f mood at judgment eliminates the possibility that 
attitudes formed on-line were simply retrieved, it is possible 
that such attitudes could be relied on to greater or lesser extent 
depending on the recip ient’s mood state. Because o f thesimpl ic- 
ity o f this retrieval strategy, subjects in a good mood might be 
most likely to rely on it. However, it was precisely under these 
conditions— when subjects were required to think about the 
different arguments o f the message and were in a good mood 
when reporting their attitudes—that no differences between 
strong and weak arguments were obtained. We assume that lack 
of differentiation of strong and weak arguments at either en­
coding or judgment both reflect the tendency for happy sub­
jects to simplify processing. Just as elaboration at encoding
Table 2
Attitude Change as a Function o f  Mood. Type o f  Representation, 
and Argument Quality (Experiment 2)
Global Detail




Neutral 6.0 3.8 4.3 3.2




Neutral 1 -1 1 -1
Negative -2 2 1 -1
Note. The possible range of values Tor agreement was 1 (strongly dis­
agree to 9 (strongly agree).
requires a considerable amount o f  processing, so too does re­
trieving the content o f or responses to the message. Presumably, 
subjects in a good mood were unable or unwilling to engage in 
this processing and so the impact o f message quality on attitude 
judgments was eliminated. Another possibility is that in sim­
plifying the processing task, subjects in a good mood used their 
estimates o f  the number of different arguments contained in 
the message as a heuristic cue in forming their attitudinal re­
sponses. Given that the number o f arguments was the same 
under both message quality conditions, this strategy would re­
sult in similar attitude judgments.
Finally, the accessibility of a global representation had little 
impact on subjects in a bad mood, resulting in a similar impact 
of argument quality under both representation conditions.7 Pre­
sumably, subjects in a bad mood engaged in a thorough recall o f  
detailed information regardless o f what representation had 
been made accessible (Schwarz, 1990), resulting in less extreme 
attitude judgments.
Latencies for Attitude Judgments
Raw latencies for the attitude judgments were unaffected by 
the experimental conditions (all Fs <  1). At first glance the 
absence o f effects on latencies for attitude judgment may seem 
inconsistent with the assumption that subjects in a good mood 
simplified their processing. However, individuals in a good 
mood are assumed to engage in less effortful processing be­
cause o f motivation or reduced capacity (Isen, 1987; Mackie & 
Worth, 1989; Schwarz, 1990), either of which might produce 
slower response times.
Judgment-Related Thought Listing
The thoughts subjects reported having while making their 
attitude judgments were coded by two independent judges.
1 Accordingly, the simple interaction of argument quality and typeof 
representation was most pronounced under good mood, F (\,169) =
8.01, p < .005, and least pronounced under bad mood, /'(1,169) = 0.01, 
with the neutral mood in between, /"(1,169)= 1.28, p < .26.
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Judges agreed on 90% of responses, and all disagreements were 
decided by a third judge. Most important, judges rated each 
statement as either specific or global. The first two thoughts 
subjects reported were analyzed in a 3 (mood) X 2 (type of mes­
sage representation) ANOVA. We focused on the first two 
thoughts to assess which thoughts were most accessible and to 
avoid including global thoughts that were produced as a result 
of specific thoughts produced about the message. Subjects 
tended to report more global thoughts after they had formed a 
global evaluation (M  = 0,29) than after they had thought about 
the number o f arguments (M = 0.17), F(l, 175) = 3.13, p  < ,08. 
In addition, a main effect o f induced mood was obtained, F{2, 
175) = 3.55, p  < .04, reflecting that subjects in a positive (A/ = 
0.32) or neutral (M  = 0.25) mood reported more global thought 
statements than did subjects in a negative mood (M  = 0.10); 
/(169) =  2.55, p  < ,02; and /(169) = 1.76, p  < .08.
Additional analyses revealed that these differences between 
subjects in a positive or a neutral mood and subjects in a nega­
tive mood were significant if  subjects had formed a global evalu­
ation (M -  0.39 and M  = 0.37 vs. M  = 0.10), /(169) = 2.38, p < 
.02, and ¿(169) = 2.21. p < .03, but not if  subjects had thought 
about the numberofarguments(A/= 0.25and.V/= O.Hvs, .V/= 
0.10), ¿(169) = 1.23, ns. and t < 1. However, the corresponding 
interaction did not reach significance.8
Presumably, subjects in a good and neutral mood were more 
likely to report global thoughts than subjects in a bad mood 
because they used these thoughts— made accessible through 
the global representation manipulation— for their preceding 
attitude judgment. Additional correlational analyses supported 
this conclusion: Significant relations between attitude judg­
ments on the one hand and rated overall strength o f the argu­
ments as well as number o f  general (favorable or unfavorable) 
thoughts on the other hand were only observed for subjects in a 
positive and neutral mood, but not for subjects in a negative 
mood.9
General Discussion
The results o f these studies provide further evidence for the 
assumption that individuals’ mood states affect their process­
ing o f persuasive communications. More important, the results 
clearly demonstrate that mood effects on processing styles are 
not limited to a specific processing stage but do in fact have 
observable effects on different stages o f processing. However, 
the effects o f mood on attitude change produced by a persua­
sive message differs dramatically depending on the particular 
processes that mood influences.
At the encoding stage, recipients in a positive mood appear to 
simplify their processing by reducing the amount o f message 
elaboration in which they engage. Accordingly, judgments 
based on this reduced processing do not reflect differences in 
the quality o f message content. On the other hand, recipients in 
negative or neutral mood states are more likely to engage in a 
systematic processing of the content o f  the message, and differ­
ential effects o f strong compared with weak arguments are thus 
obtained. Extending previous research that involved possible 
confounds o f mood at the time o f encoding and mood at the 
time o f  attitude assessment (Bless et al., 1990; Mackie & Worth, 
1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987), Experiment 1 demonstrated that
recipients’ mood at the time o f  encoding is sufficient to pro­
duce the previously observed effects.
Independent o f their influence on initial message elabora­
tion, moods induced after the message was encoded also in­
fluenced attitude judgments. Although this influence resulted 
in a completely different pattern o f attitude reports, it presum­
ably reflects the same underlying process. Just as individuals in 
a good mood appear to simplify processing at encoding by 
failing to elaborate, the results in the relevant conditions of  
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that individuals who are in a good 
mood at the time o f attitude assessment simplify processing by 
failing to retrieve details o f or responses to the previously en­
coded message. Rather, they seem to access some global evalua­
tive representation of the message, which may serve as a heuris­
tic cue in forming their attitude judgment. Given that judg­
ments that are based on simple cognitive structures tend to be 
more extreme than judgments based on more detail (Judd & 
Lusk, 1984; Linville, 1982; Linville & Jones, 1980), this process 
resulted in an accentuated impact o f message quality when sub­
jects were in a good mood. This was the case when no specific 
representation was elicited (Experiment 1) as well as when a 
global representation was deliberately evoked (Experiment 2). 
Forming a detailed representation of the content o f the mes­
sage, on the other hand, apparently interfered with the use of 
this heuristic, resulting in the absence o f an impact of message 
quality (Experiment 2) that parallels the effect o f positive mood 
at message elaboration. Thus, message quality had an impact 
only when it had been incorporated into a heuristic cue that 
could be used to simplify processing.
In contrast, subjects in a bad mood differentiated between 
strong and weak arguments independently o f whether mood 
was present when the message was encoded or when attitude 
judgments were reported and independently o f whether a 
global evaluation was easily accessible or not. This suggests that 
subjects in a bad mood engaged in a systematic processing of 
the message whether at encoding or by recalling the content
'  Further analyses revealed that mood inductions did not affect the 
total number of thoughts subjects reported (p >  .20) For all effects 
involving mood. Subjects asked to think about the number of different 
arguments of the message reported having slightly more thoughts 
when the message quality was poor(.W = 4.9) than when it was strong 
(A/ = 4.1), i(169) = 1.95, p < .06, whereas subjects who had formed a 
global evaluation reported as many thoughts when the arguments were 
weak (A/ = 4,8) as when they were strong(M = 4.4), / < I. resulting in an 
interaction between argument quality and representation type, F(l. 
169) = 3.90, p < .05. An analysisofthe time subjects needed for report­
ing their thoughts revealed that subjects used more lime when they 
were exposed to weak than to strong arguments (M = 166.8 s vs. M  =
138.8 s), F( 1,169) = 4.67, p < .04, all other ps > .10.
9 Correlations between attitude judgments and rated overall strength 
of arguments were as follows: For positive mood, r - .29, n = 31. p< .06; 
for neutral mood, r -  .39, n = 30. p < .02; and for negative mood, r  = 
-.11, ns. Correlations between attitude judgments and number of gen­
eral favorable thoughts were as follows: For positive mood, r = .42. n = 
31, p <.09; for neutral mood, r = .28, n = 30. p <.07: and for negative 
mood. r= -.20, ns. Correlations between altitude judgments and num- 
berof general unfavorable thoughts were as follows: For positive mood, 
r -  —,38,/i = 31, p <-02; for neutral mood, r=  -.53. « = 30. p <.01; and 
for negative mood, r = —.19, ns.
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and thoughts elicited by the message at the time o f  judgment. 
In fact, subjects in a bad mood apparently did not use a heuris­
tic processing strategy even when it was made possible by the 
presence o f an easily accessible global representation.
The present results extend a processing approach to the issue 
of how affective states influence persuasion (for overviews see 
Mackie, Asuncion, & Rosselli, in press; Mackie & Worth, 1991; 
Schwarz et al, 1991). Previous studies identified capacity (Isen, 
1987; Mackie & Worth, 1989) and motivation (Bless et al, 1990; 
Schwarz, 1990) as possible antecedents o f  the finding that indi­
viduals in a good mood tend to simplify processing (for over­
views see Fiedler, 1988; Isen, 1987; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & 
Bless, 1991), and thus show reduced elaboration at encoding, 
compared with subjects in a bad or neutral mood. This in turn 
reduces the impact o f argument quality on the attitudinal out­
comes o f happy compared with neutral or sad subjects. The 
present studies extend the range o f the processing analysis of 
mood effects in persuasion in two directions.
First, the studies provide clear evidence o f mood effects on 
judgmental processes contributing to attitude formation and 
change (independently o f effects at encoding). Indeed, the pre­
sented findings emphasize the importance o f delineating the 
different stages involved in processing persuasive communica­
tions. Both experiments indicate that the elaboration o f mes­
sage content at encoding is not the only variable that may lead 
to differences in the attitudinal impact o f strong and weak 
arguments.
Second, our findings point out the importance o f specify­
ing how information relevant to forming an attitude 
judgment—particularly information from persuasive messages 
—is represented in memory. Our data challenge the notion that 
attitude judgments formed or reported some time after mes­
sage presentation are either retrieved from memory intact (Lin- 
gle & Ostrom, 1981) or calculated from retrieved cognitive re­
sponses made during initial encoding (Greenwald, 1968; Love
& Greenwald, 1978). We argue that, in addition, subjects may 
also rely on nonattitudinal global representations o f the mes­
sage formed during encoding. Further work on this topic could 
benefit, as ours did, from models that address how social knowl­
edge in other domains is represented.
In fact, the persuasion domain seems to be especially fruitful 
for further investigating the differential implications of affec­
tive states on processing in general. Tracing the impact o f affect 
on many domain-specific judgments has proven difficult be­
cause little is known about the cognitive processes involved in 
making such judgments. In the attitude domain, however, 
much is now known about the various processes that underlie 
attitude formation or change. Our results indicate that re­
searchers will need to dedicate more attention to isolating the 
impact o f mood on various and multiple processing stages. The 
impact o f affective states on cognitive processing is not limited 
to a single processing stage. Rather, the increased heuristic pro­
cessing under positive mood, and increased systematic process­
ing under negative mood, is likely to show different effects at 
different processing stages, thus adding to the complexity of  
the affect-cognition interplay
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This study investigated the independent effects of induced mood on the encoding of persuasive 
messages and on the assessment of attitude judgments. In Experiment 1, positive or negative mood 
was induced either before the encoding of a counterattitudinal message or before the assessment of 
attitude judgments. When mood was induced before message presentation, Ss in a bad mood were 
more persuaded by strong than by weak arguments, whereas Ss in a good mood were equally 
persuaded by strong and by weak arguments. When Ss encoded the message in a neutral mood, 
however, the advantage of strong over weak arguments was more pronounced when Ss were in a 
good rather than in a bad mood at the time of attitude assessment. In Experiment 2, Ss exposed to a 
counterattitudinal message composed of either strong or weak arguments formed either a global 
evaluation or a detailed representation of the message. Positive, negative, or neutral mood was then 
induced. Ss in a good mood were most likely and Ss in a negative mood least likely to base their 
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Using a range o f different mood inductions and persuasive 
messages about a variety o f  attitudinal issues, recent studies 
have consistently found that recipients’ processing o f  persua­
sive communications depends on their affective state. Whereas 
people in neutral or negative moods are differentially affected 
by the quality o f  persuasive messages and report more favorable 
attitudes after exposure to strong rather than weak arguments, 
recipients in a good mood are as persuaded by weak as strong 
arguments. Moreover, cognitive responses to persuasive mes­
sages reflect the quality o f  the presented arguments when peo­
ple are in neutral or bad moods, but not when they are in good 
moods (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Innes & 
Ahrens, 1991; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987; 
for an overview see Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991).
These findings are consistent with recent models o f  mood 
effects on processing style that suggest that individuals in posi­
tive affective states lend to simplify processing tasks (for re­
views see Fiedler, 1988; Isen, 1987; Schwarz, 1990). That recipi­
ents in a good mood are equally persuaded by strong and by
Experiment 1 was conducted by Herbert Bless in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for a doctoral dissertation, supported by Grants 
Schw 278/2 and Str 264/3 from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
to Norbert Schwarz and Fritz Strack. Experiment 2 was supported by a 
fellowship from the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) to 
Herbert Bless and by Grant MH 43041 from the National Institute of 
Mental Health to Diane M. Mackie.
We thank David Meisels and Lisa Minnelli for their help with data 
collection for Experiment 2.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Her­
bert Bless, FP Subjektive Erfahrung, Universität Mannheim, Steuben- 
strasse 46, D-6800 Mannheim, Federal Republic of Germany.
weak arguments has accordingly been interpreted as indicating 
that these recipients are less likely to engage in “systematic” 
(Chaiken, 1980, 1987) or “central route” processing (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981,1986; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976) o f  the con­
tent o f persuasive messages. Because they appear not to elabo­
rate the content o f a message extensively, recipients in a good 
mood are more likely to be influenced by the use o f simplifying 
cognitive strategies to assess message validity. This conclusion 
is supported by the finding that attitudes o f  subjects in a posi­
tive but not a neutral mood reflect the presence o f  heuristic 
cues (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987). More­
over, increasing the amount o f elaboration by providing addi­
tional time for processing eliminates the typical effect o f  posi­
tive mood (Mackie & Worth, 1989), and experimentally de­
creasing the amount o f elaboration by introducing a distracter 
task produces identical attitude judgments in subjects in both 
positive and negative moods (Bless et a l, 1990, Experiment 2).
Although the impact o f mood has been attributed to its im­
pact on encoding in all o f the previously mentioned studies, it 
remains unclear whether mood at encoding constitutes a suffi­
cient condition for the observed effects. In all studies, mood 
was induced immediately before a rather short message was 
presented and attitudes were assessed as soon as the presenta­
tion was completed. Thus, recipients could have been in the 
same affective state both when they encoded the message and 
when they reported their attitude judgment. Accordingly, recipi­
ents’ mood at the time o f  encoding and at the time o f  attitude 
assessment may have been confounded in this research. Experi­
ment 1 was designed first to investigate the crucial role o f  mood 
at encoding independent o f  mood at assessment, and second to 
explore possible mood effects that may occur after the message 
has been encoded.
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Experiment 1
If the previously obtained findings reflect only the impact of 
mood at encoding, the pattern o f effects typically found should 
again be obtained when mood is induced at elaboration but 
allowed lo dissipate before attitude assessment. That is, recipi­
ents who encode the message in a negative mood should report 
more favorable attitudes after exposure to strong as compared 
with weak arguments, whereas recipients who encode the 
message in a positive mood should be unaffected by argument 
quality.
How might recipients’ mood influence attitude judgments 
made about material encoded before an affective state was in­
duced? Given that sufficient message elaboration occurs during 
encoding, various strategies might be used when attitude judg­
ments are later required. Moreover, different strategies might 
be preferred by individuals in different mood states.
Suppose that while encoding the message in a nonaffective 
state recipients spontaneously form an attitude judgment that 
reflects the differential impact o f  strong versus weak argu­
ments. If so, they may simply retrieve this previously formed 
judgment when later asked to report their attitude (Lingle & 
Oslrom, 1981). If this is the case, the attitudes of subjects in 
both positive and negative moods should equally reflect argu­
ment quality
Often, however, a particular judgment may not be formed 
during encoding because other processing objectives are re­
quired (Hastie & Park, 1986; Mackie & Asuncion, 1990), or it 
may not be easily accessible in memory. In such circumstances 
subjects have to recall attitude relevant information lo compute 
the required judgment. At least three types o f  information 
could be retrieved.
First, subjects may try to recall as much relevant information 
as possible. Given the retrieval advantage o f internally gener­
ated material (Slamecka& Graf, 1978) the most accessible mate­
rial may well be the cognitive responses generated in response 
to processing the message (Greenwald, 1968; Love & Green- 
wald, 1978). For all intents and purposes, this retrieval strategy 
simulates elaboration during message presentation, and atti­
tudes should thus reflect the quality o f  the arguments. Because 
subjects in a good mood attempt to simplify processing, they 
are less likely to engage in this effort than subjects in a bad or 
neutral mood. Accordingly the differential impact o f strong 
versus weak arguments should be stronger for subjects in a bad 
mood rather than a good mood, paralleling the effects o f mood 
at encoding.
Second, instead o f  an effortful recall o f  reactions to message 
content, subjects could simply retrieve characterizations o f the 
message that represented some kind o f  summary of the pro­
vided information. This might be a global evaluation o f the 
message as weak or strong, unaccompanied by information 
about particular arguments or responses (that may or may not 
have been stored simultaneously during encoding, Ebbesen, 
1980,1981; Wyer & Srull, 1989). As judgments based on simple 
structures have been demonstrated to be more extreme than 
judgments based on more complex knowledge structures (Lin- 
ville, 1982; Linville & Jones, 1980; Judd & Lusk, 1984) this 
strategy should result in judgments that clearly differentiate 
between messages comprising strong versus weak arguments.
As this strategy seems to simplify cognitive processing, it 
should especially be preferred by subjects in positive moods. If 
so, the impact o f argument quality may be more pronounced 
when subjects are in a good rather than a bad mood at the time 
o f attitude assessment, reversing the previously obtained im­
pact o f  mood at encoding.
A third possibility is that subjects attempt to retrieve infor­
mation from the message or their reaction to it but that this 
process is influenced by their current mood state (Forgas & 
Bower, 1987; Srull, 1983). This would give a retrieval advantage 
to mood-congruent material, suggesting that subjects in a posi­
tive mood would retrieve predominantly favorable information 
and thus be persuaded, whereas subjects in a negative mood 
would retrieve predominantly unfavorable material and show 
no attitude change.
Finally, individuals may make the judgment by consulting 
their own affective state according to a “how-do-I-feel-about- 
it?” heuristic (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988). One’s subjective 
affective state may thus be used (either appropriately or inappro­
priately) as a heuristic cue. If individuals in a good mood are 
more likely to use such a heuristic, their judgments should be 
more positive than judgments o f  individuals in a bad mood, 
regardless o f argument quality. In summary, the first two recall- 
based hypotheses predict interaction effects o f  mood and argu­
ment quality, whereas the last two hypotheses predict a main 
effect o f mood.
Method 
Subjects and Design
Seventy-six University or Heidelberg students received DM10 (ap­
proximately 55 at Ihe time of the experiment) for their participation. 
Subjects were run in groups of 3 to 6 and were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of a 2 (positive or negative mood) X 2 (strong or weak argu­
ments) X  2 (mood induced at encoding or at judgment) factorial design.
Procedure
Subjects were informed that they would be completing several dif­
ferent and independent tasks and that they would be asked some ques­
tions about each of the completed tasks. It was emphasized that these 
tasks all involved pretesting language materials for use in other studies. 
These tasks (described later) included (a) the mood induction, (b) the 
presentation of the persuasive message, (c) a neutral filler task, and (d) 
the assessment of dependent variables. The order in which the mood 
induction task and the filler task was presented was counterbalanced 
(as described later) to induce positive or negative mood either before 
message encoding or before the assessment of attitudes. Most of the 
experimental manipulations of Experiment 1 had been used success­
fully in two earlier experiments (Bless et al., 1990).
Mood induction. In this task, subjects were asked to provide a vivid 
and detailed written report of either a happy orasad life event, purport­
edly lo help with the construction o f a “Heidelberg Life Event Inven­
tory" Reporting a happy event was intended to induce positive mood, 
whereas focusing on an experienced sad event was intended to induce 
negative mood (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Strack, Schwarz, & Gschnei- 
dinger, 1985). Subjects were given 15 min for their report and were then 
asked several questions about the task. Embedded among these ques­
tions was a manipulation check that read, “How do you feel right 
now?” (I s* very bad and 11 = very good).
Presentation o f persuasive message and manipulation o f argument
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quality. Subjects were told that this task was concerned with language 
comprehension and with pretesting the comprehensibility ofa particu­
lar text. Subjects listened to a tape-recorded communication that an­
nounced an increase in student services fees from DM45 to DM65 per 
semester (an increase of approximately $10) slated to take effect at the 
beginning of the next academic year at the University of Heidelberg.' 
The fee increase was justified in the communication with either 11 
strong or 11 weak arguments. Differences in the quality o f these sets of 
arguments had been convincingly demonstrated in previous studies 
(Bless et at., 1990). Both messages were of approximately equal length.
After listening to the message, subjects answered several questions 
about the presentation of the message (e.g., how acoustically clear the 
speaker was, bow appropriate the speaker’s style of speaking was, how 
easy or difficult the language used in the text was to understand, and 
how well they could concentrate on the text). None of these questions 
referred to the quality or content of the message.
The cover story that various texts were being pretested, the intro­
duction of this particular task as concerning language comprehension, 
and the selection of questions that focused on various linguistic 
aspects of the message were all designed to reduce the likelihood that 
subjects would form attitudinal judgments during encoding of the 
message. As in previous research, the presentation of alternative pro­
cessing goals during encoding and judgment was designed to inhibit 
on-line attitude formation (Hastie & Park, 1986; Lichtenstein & Srull, 
1987; Mackie & Asuncion, 1990),
Neutral filler task. This task required subjects to read a text about a 
man having dinner at a restaurant and to reproduce this story. The 
content of this filler task was unrelated to the content of the persuasive 
message and did not include any statements potentially eliciting a posi­
tive or a negative mood stale. Subjects were given 15 min to complete 
this task.
After completing the filler task, subjects were asked several ques­
tions, one of which again served to assess mood. Subjects responded to 
the item “How do you feel now?” by checking the same scale used to 
assess the mood manipulation.
The neutral filler task had two purposes. First, it was intended to 
ensure the return ofsubjects to a relatively neutral mood state. Thus, in 
the case in which the filler task followed the mood manipulation and 
the presentation of the persuasive message, it was designed to ensure 
that any mood effects present during message encoding were no longer 
present when attitude judgments were reported during the dependent 
measure task. When the filler task preceded message presentation it 
ensured that subjects were all in a relatively uniformly neutral mood at 
message presentation, regardless of their mood state on entering the 
experiment. The filler task also served to equate the passage of time 
spent on the mood induction task so that regardless of order condition, 
15 min elapsed between presentation of the persuasive communica­
tion and the assessment of the dependent measures.
Induction ofmood before or after message presentation. The order in 
which the mood induction task and the filler task was presented was 
counterbalanced. For half the subjects the mood induction immedi­
ately preceded the presentation of the message and the filler task fol­
lowed message presentation. In this condition, induced mood was in­
tended to be present at encoding of the persuasive message but to have 
dissipated before the dependent measures were assessed. For the other 
half o f the subjects, the filler task preceded message presentation, and 
the mood induction followed the message but immediately preceded 
assessment of the dependent variables. In this condition, it was in­
tended that mood effects would not be present during encoding but 
would be present during the assessment of dependent measures.
Dependent Measures
Attitude judgment. Before answering other questions subjects indi­
cated their approval of the anticipated increase in student fees by
checking a 9-point rating scale where 1 indicated strongly disapprove 
and 9, strongly approve.
Cognitive responses. Subjects were then given 3 min in which to list 
“all thoughts that came to mind while listening to the tape recording.” 
Subjects were provided with a sheet of paper divided into 10 boxes and 
were instructed to list only one thought per box. Subjects were not 
required to use all the boxes. After completing the thought listing, 
subjects indicated whether each thought they bad listed was favorable 
(supportive of the proposed fee increase), unfavorable (opposed to the 
increase), or neutral (unrelated to the issue).
Recall o f message content. Finally, in a surprise recall test, subjects 
were given 3 min in which to write down any and all the presented 
arguments they could remember.
Results 
Effectiveness of Mood Manipulations
Responses to the items assessing subjects’ mood before mes­
sage presentation and before attitude assessment were analyzed 
by two analyses o f  variance (ANOVAs).
Mood at encoding. Subjects’ self reports of subjective state 
immediately before being exposed to the persuasive communi­
cation revealed a significant main effect for mood, ^(2, 61 )2 =
6.55, p  < .003, as expected. Subjects who had described a posi­
tive life event reported being in a better mood {M =  7.8) than 
both subjects who had described a negative life event {M= 5.9), 
/(6l) = 3.61, p < .0005, and subjects who had worked on the 
filler task (M = 7.1), t(61) = 1.70, p  < .05. In addition, subjects 
who had described a negative life event reported being sadder 
than subjects who had worked on the filler task, i(61) = -2 .3 2 , 
p  <  .02 (all comparisons one-tailed). Thus, mood was success­
fully manipulated before presentation o f the persuasive commu­
nication.
Mood at assessment o f  attitudes. The responses o f  subjects 
who had described life events immediately before assessment of 
the dependent measures also revealed a main effect for induced 
mood, F{2,72) -1 .3 3 ,  p <  .002. Those who described a positive 
life event reported being in a better mood (M  = 8.7) than both 
subjects who had described a negative life event (M  = 6.3), 
/(72) = 3.73, p  < .0005, and subjects who had worked on the 
filler task (M =  7.1 ), i(72) = 2.86, p  < .003. In addition, subjects 
who had worked on the filler task reported marginally better 
mood than subjects who had described a negative life event, 
?(75) = -1 .46 , p  < .08 (all comparisons one-tailed). Mood had 
thus been successfully induced immediately before assessment 
o f the dependent measures. In addition, the comparisons with 
reports from subjects completing the neutral filler task indi­
cated that the effects o f mood induced before message presenta­
tion had dissipated before attitude assessment, as intended.
1 Although an increase of DM20 may seem slight, it should be noted 
that the last actual fee increase of DM11 in 1982 caused massive stu­
dent protests. The proposed increase was thus clearly counteratlitu- 
dinal for the subjects.
1 Eleven subjects in the mood at judgment condition did not fully 
complete the neutral filler task before message presentation. The re­
sponses of these subjects did not differ from those of other subjects in
this condition on any dependent variable (all ps > .20) and were in­
cluded in the analysis.
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Attitude Change
The influence o f the persuasive communication was inferred 
from recipients’ approval o f the suggested fee increase. Mean 
approval scores appear in Table 1 as a function of induced 
mood, liming o f mood induction, and argument quality.
The extent to which subjects agreed with the advocaied in­
crease was analyzed in a 2 (mood) X  2 (timing o f mood induc­
tion) X  2 (argument quality) between-subjects ANOVA. Subjects 
reported greater approval o f  the fee increase after hearing 
strong (A/ = 4.16) as compared with weak (M  = 2.28) argu­
ments, F(l, 68) = 22.75, p < .005. As predicted, however, this 
differential effect o f argument quality was affected by both the 
induced mood and the timing o f the mood induction, as re­
vealed by a significant three-way interaction involving these 
factors, F(1,68) = 6.94, p  <  .02. To clarify these effects, further 
analyses were performed to investigate the independent effects 
of mood at the time of encoding and at the time o f judgment
M ood at encoding. A simple effects analysis revealed a main 
effect o f  message quality, F(1, 68) = 3.95, p  < .05, qualified by a 
marginally significant interaction between the valence o f the 
mood induced before message presentation and the quality of 
arguments presented in the message, F (l, 68) = 3.29, p < .07. 
Specifically, strong arguments were more influential than weak 
arguments when subjects were in a bad mood at the time of 
encoding o f  the message, i(68) = 2.68, p  <  .009, but argument 
quality had no impact when subjects were in a good mood at 
that time (/ <  1 ). Thus, when mood was induced at encoding 
and had dissipated by the time judgments were reported, the 
pattern of results replicated previous findings (Bless et al., 1990; 
Mackie & Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987). This finding 
demonstrates that recipients’ mood at encoding is sufficient to 
produce the previously reported effects, given that ihe induced 
mood states had dissipated by the time o f the attitude report.
M ood at assessment o f  attitude judgment. When mood was 
manipulated immediately before attitude judgments were as­
sessed, strong arguments produced more approval than weak 
arguments for all subjects (Af -  4.5 vs. M  = 2.0), F(l, 68) =
21.76, p  <  .001, for the simple main effect. However, this effect 
was even more pronounced for subjects in a good mood (A/ =
5.2 and M  = 1.6 for strong and weak arguments, respectively), 
f(68) = 4.65, p  <  .0005, than for subjects in a bad mood (Af =  3.8 
and M  = 2.3 for strong and weak arguments, respectively), 
/(68) = 1.95, p  < .06. This pattern is reflected in a marginally 
significant simple interaction, F(l, 68) = 3.67, p  < .06, indicat­
ing that mood induction at the time o f  judgment was also capa­
ble o f influencing persuasion outcomes.
Cognitive Responses and Message Recall
The proportion o f  favorable and unfavorable thoughts in re­
sponse to strong and weak arguments during encoding was in­
fluenced by the nature and timing o f  the induced mood stale. 
Overall, subjects reported a higher proportion of favorable 
thoughts in response to strong than to weak arguments 
(M  = 0.29 vs. 0.13), F(l, 68) = 11.40, p  < .001, and a lower 
proportion o f  unfavorable thoughts (A/ = 0.38 vs. 0.57), jp(l, 
68) = 10.86, p  < .002.
More important, however, these main effects were qualified
Table 1
Attitude Change as a Function o f  Mood, Timing o f Mood 
Induction, and Argument Quality (Experiment 1)
Timing of mood induction
Mood before Mood before
encoding judgment
Argument type Positive Negative Positive Negative
Strong 3.6 4.1 5.2 3.8
Weak 3.4 1.9 1.6 2.3
Note. The possible range of values for approval was I (strongly disap­
prove) to 9 (strongly approve).
by the impact of both induced mood and the timing o f the 
mood induction, indicated by marginal interaction effects for 
both favorable responses, F(l, 68) =  3.59, p  < .07, and unfavor­
able responses, F 0 , 68) =  2.59, p  <  .12. Replicating previous 
research, strong arguments elicited a higher proportion o f favor­
able and a smaller proportion o f unfavorable thoughts than 
weak arguments when subjects were in a negative (Bless et al., 
1990) or a neutral mood (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Worth & 
Mackie, 1987) but not when subjects were in a good mood while 
encoding the message.3,4
Discussion
The present results demonstrate that recipients’ mood state 
can affect attitude judgments either by influencing the encod­
ing o f the message or by influencing processes independent o f  
initial message elaboration. In contrast with all other subjects, 
subjects in a good mood during message encoding did not show 
differential attitude change nor differential cognitive responses 
to messages containing strong or weak arguments. This finding 
adds further support to the idea that recipients in a good mood 
simplify processing by reducing the amount o f message elabora­
tion (for an overview see Schwarz et al., 1991). More important, 
the results extend previous findings in two ways. First, given 
that the induced mood state had dissipated by the time atti­
tudes were reported, the findings indicate recipients’ mood at 
encoding is by itself sufficient to produce the previously re-
3 Specifically, subjects in a negative mood reported a higher propor­
tion of favorable thoughts and a lower proportion of unfavorable after 
strong than after weak arguments (M = 0.33 vs. Af= 0.07 and M= 0.35 
vs. M  = 0.54), ¿(68) => 2.57, p < .02, and /(68) = -1.49, ns. These 
differences were not obtained for subjects who were in a good mood 
during message exposure ( M - 0.19 vs. M=  0.24 and M -  0,46 vs. M -  
0.53), both /s < 1. Subjects in a neutral mood while encoding, that is, 
those for whom mood was induced after encoding, reported a higher 
proportion of favorable thoughts and a lower proportion of unfavor­
able after strong than after weak arguments (M = 0.32 vs. M  = 0.11 and 
M =  0.35 vs. M  = 0.60), t(68) = 3.23, p <  .01, and /(68) = 3.17 p < .01.
4 Subjects’ recall of the presented arguments was unaffected by their 
affective state. Overall, strong arguments were belter recalled (M  =
7.2) than weak arguments (Af= 6.1), F(l, 68) = 20.45, p  < .005, but no 
other effects of the variables on total recall were found, again parallel­
ing previous findings (Bless et aL 1990).
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ported effects o f  positive mood on persuasive processing. Sec­
ond, the present results also suggest that happy recipients can­
not later compensate for their lack o f message elaboration, even 
if the attitude judgment is required when the initial affective 
slate has dissipated.
The impact o f  induced mood was not restricted to the encod­
ing stage, however. When a positive or negative mood was in­
duced after subjects had encoded the message in a neutral 
mood, the advantage o f strong over weak arguments was more 
pronounced for subjects in a good mood. This occurred despite 
the fact that subjects’ recall o f and cognitive responses to mes­
sage content were not affected by postmessage mood induc­
tions, indicating that all subjects had encoded and elaborated 
the message to the same degree, as intended. Our results thus 
indicate that moods may affect judgmental processes, and 
hence the effectiveness o f  persuasive communications, even if 
they are induced after the persuasive message has been en­
coded.
The pattern o f attitude outcomes we obtained under these 
conditions allowed us to eliminate several processing pathways 
by which affect induced at judgment could have had its effects. 
First, the fact that mood effects were obtained eliminates the 
possibility that subjects had formed attitudes on-line and were 
merely reporting those previously formed judgments. If this 
had been the case, there would have been no evidence o f mood 
effects on outcomes, as all subjects processed the message in a 
neutral mood. This finding confirms the effectiveness o f the 
technique o f  presenting subjects with other processing goals for 
inhibiting on-line judgments (Hastie & Park, 1986; Lichten­
stein & Srull, 1987; Mackie & Asuncion, 1990). Second, the 
obtained pattern eliminated the possibility that subjects re­
trieved cognitive responses previously elicited by the message 
to simulate on-line elaboration. Again, if  this were the case, all 
subjects should have produced similar judgments, as all sub­
jects encoded the message under identical conditions. Finally, 
the failure to find a main effect that reflected greater persua­
sion in the positive mood condition eliminated two other possi­
bilities. Both biased retrieval o f mood-congruent responses or 
reliance on the how-do-I-feel-about-it? heuristic would have 
produced such a pattern. Thus, it appears that neither o f  these 
possibilities can explain the impact that mood induced before 
judgment had on attitudinal outcomes.
In summary, the impact o f  induced mood state produced 
diametrically opposed patterns depending on when mood was 
induced: The differential impact o f  strong versus weak argu­
ments was decreased when positive mood was induced before 
message presentation, whereas it was increased when positive 
mood was induced after message presentation but before the 
assessment o f attitude judgments. We propose that both effects 
are due to subjects’ tendency to reduce cognitive effort while 
being in a good mood. When mood is induced before exposure 
to the message, good mood results in reduced elaboration o f  
message content. When mood is induced after message encod­
ing but before attitude assessment, it presumably affects what 
information subjects use in making a judgment. Specifically, 
our findings suggest that although subjects who encoded the 
message in a neutral mood had similar representations of the 
message available, subjects in different mood conditions based 
their judgment on different aspects o f  this representation. The
obtained pattern suggested that the impact o f positive mood 
was to rely on some representation that further strengthened 
the impact o f argument quality, yet did not involve mood-spe­
cific retrieval o f  arguments from or reactions to the message. 
Thus, in the second experiment we turned our attention to 
investigating what representations o f  message content formed 
during encoding may have been used by subjects in a positive 
mood at judgment to produce the obtained effects.
Experiment 2
Unfortunately, previous research has had little to say about 
how persuasive messages are represented in memory or about 
the way in which retrieval o f different types o f information can 
influence attitude judgments. Relevant hypotheses can be de­
rived, however, from research in other domains (Hastie, Park, 
& Weber, 1984; Wyer & Gordon, 1984; Wyer & Srull, 1989). 
There is increasing agreement across models that representa­
tion of social information may simultaneously contain both 
global and specific information. For example, Ebbesen (1980, 
1981) and Wyer and Srull (1989) have argued that both global 
impressions o f and individual behaviors performed by target 
persons may be stored during encoding and that either can be 
used as the basis for judgments. Using these assumptions as a 
parallel, we suggest that representations o f attitude-relevant in­
formation in a persuasive message could include global evalua­
tions (e.g, “This was pretty convincing.”) or more detailed infor­
mation (such as presented arguments, cognitive responses to 
them, and other details o f the persuasive context), or both. If so, 
attitude judgments might be based on different representations 
o f the same message. Moreover, subjects’ processing strategy 
may determine which representation is used, which in turn 
may determine the resulting attitude judgment.
In many situations in which on-line attitude change occurs, it 
is likely that one o f  the global judgments formed and encoded is 
an attitude judgment, either a new judgment or a modification 
o f a previously held opinion. The encoding conditions we in­
duced, however, inhibited the formation o f on-line attitudes (as 
indicated by the results o f Experiment 1 ). What global represen­
tations o f the message might have been formed spontaneously 
in this case? Given that we explicitly directed subjects to the 
nature of the language used in the message, it is likely that 
global evaluations o f  the language and arguments as strong and 
powerful (“Those were pretty good arguments.”) or weak and 
specious (“Those arguments were pathetic.”) may well have 
been formed.5 Thus, such summary evaluations—as well as 
specific arguments and cognitive responses— might have been 
stored after encoding and may have been available for later use 
in making an attitude judgment.
What, however, would be the effect o f retrieving global repre­
sentations o f a persuasive message? In fact, reliance on global 
evaluations might produce judgments that are more extreme
5 The formation of a global evaluation of the message (“it was a 
strong message” or “there wasn’t much to support the position”) does 
not entail the formation of an attitude judgment about the issue, as 
evidenced by the independence of perceptions of the quality o f argu­
ments and their effects on attitude change (Bless etaL 1990; Mackie & 
Worth, 1989).
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than those based on careful processing o f  details o f the mes­
sage. Evidence for this assumption is provided by findings sug­
gesting that judgments are more Likely to be extreme if they are 
based on simple knowledge structures and schemata rather 
than on more complex knowledge structures (Judd & Lusk, 
1984; Linville, 1982; Linville & Jones, 1980). It is argued that 
relying on simple representations decreases the number of dif­
ferent dimensions used in the judgment. Thus, it becomes 
more likely that moderating or inconsistent information is 
omitted. By the same argument, complex representations in­
cluding multiple dimensions increase the likelihood of moder­
ate, less extreme judgments. In the persuasive context, then, 
reliance on retrieval o f the message’s content would produce a 
main effect for argument quality. However, not all arguments 
may appear equally strong or weak to all recipients. To the 
extent that recipients rely on global evaluations, these (partially 
idiosyncratic) differences in the strength o f  individual argu­
ments may be missed. As a result, the use o f  global evaluations 
may accentuate differences between messages, resulting in sig­
nificantly stronger effects o f overall argument quality in atti­
tude judgments.
At least two factors may influence which type of message 
representation will be used in making attitudinal judgments. 
First, a representation is more likely to be used if  its accessibil­
ity is increased (Wyer & Srull, 1989). For example, any represen­
tation that has been recently formed, used, or activated in some 
way is more likely to provide the basis for a judgment than is 
less accessible material.
Second, the use o f different representations may depend on 
the degree to which the perceiver chooses to or is able to allo­
cate resources to the judgment process. Retrieving the numer­
ous detailed and specific arguments and thoughts elicited by 
the message content requires a considerable amount o f  process­
ing. Not only must repeated retrieval be sustained, but the inde­
pendent pieces o f retrieved information need to be combined. 
In contrast, an already existing global evaluation can serve as a 
single cue on which attitude judgments are made. Thus, global 
evaluations may have more impact when other variables de­
crease the amount of processing. In contrast, variables that 
increase the amount o f processing should make it more likely 
that thoughts elicited by the message w ill be reconsidered.
These considerations provide a tentative explanation for the 
results obtained in our first experiment. As noted earlier, pre­
vious evidence suggests that individuals in a positive mood 
tend to simplify their processing and rely on the use o f simple 
heuristics (Fiedler, 1988; Isen, 1987; Schwarz, 1990). If so, little 
attention may be allocated to judgment processes (just as posi­
tive mood at encoding results in reduced elaboration), and 
happy subjects should be more likely to use a global evaluation 
as a heuristic cue to an appropriate attitude judgment. This in 
turn would result in more extreme judgments. The use o f global 
evaluations as a basis for making later attitude judgments thus 
provides a possible explanation o f the increased impact of mes­
sage quality found under the elated m ood at judgment condi­
tions o f Experiment 1.
The mediating role o f reliance on different message represen­
tations as a possible explanation o f our findings was tested 
more directly in Experiment 2. In addition to manipulating 
induced mood and the strength o f presented arguments, we
manipulated the accessibility o f  different message representa­
tions. This was accomplished by requiring subjects either to 
judge the message as a whole on the dimension ofquality or to 
consider the multiple and different arguments comprising the 
message. Whereas the former task should result in a global 
evaluative representation o f the message, the latter task should 
result in a more detailed representation. In the neutral mood 
condition, we expected subjects to rely more on the detailed or 
on the global representation, depending on which one was ren­
dered more accessible by the preceding task. Thus, we expected 
to see an effect for argument quality when the detailed represen­
tation was accessible and an even greater effect o f message qual­
ity when global evaluations were accessible.
The accessibility o f different representations was expected to 
have different effects in the affective conditions, however. The 
accessibility o f  a global evaluation absolves subjects in a positive 
mood from doing extensive processing; thus, they are likely to 
rely heavily on it and we expected a strong effect for message 
quality in this condition. If a global evaluation is not easily 
accessible, however, attitude judgments can only be based on 
the more difficult recall and integration o f the arguments and 
thoughts stored in the detailed representation. As individuals 
in a good mood are less likely to engage in this effortful process, 
their attitudes should not reflect message quality when the de­
tailed representation is most accessible.
In contrast, if  individuals in negative affective states are more 
likely to engage in a more systematic and effortful processing 
(Fiedler, 1988; Schwarz, 1990), they should engage in a thor­
ough recall o f  all information they can remember. Thus, the 
absence or presence o f  an easily accessible global evaluation 
should have little impact on their attitude judgments, which 
should reflect argument quality independently o f the type of 
representation formed.
Based on these considerations, we made the following pre­
dictions. When a global evaluation was accessible, we expected 
it to be used by subjects in a good and in a neutral mood, but 
not by subjects in a bad mood. Thus, we expected attitude judg­
ments of subjects in a good or a neutral mood to reflect the 
overall quality o f the arguments more strongly than attitude 
judgments o f  subjects in a bad mood. In contrast, when a de­
tailed representation o f  the message was made easily accessible, 
we expected subjects in a neutral and a bad mood, but not 
subjects in a good mood, to use recalled details in computing 
an attitude judgment. Accordingly, attitude judgments o f  sub­
jects in a bad and a neutral mood, but not o f subjects in a good 
mood, should reflect message quality under this condition.
Method 
Subjects and Design
One hundred eighty-one introductory psychology students at the 
University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB), received partial 
credit for their participation. Subjects were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of a 3 (positive, neutral, or negative mood at the time of 
judgment) X  2 (strong or weak arguments) X  2 (global evaluation or 
detailed representation) factorial design. Subjects were run in groups 
of 3 to 6.
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Procedure
Subjects assembled in a reception room and were told that they 
would be asked to complete a number of unrelated tasks. These tasks 
included the viewing and evaluation of materials presented both by 
video and on a computer screen. Subjects were seated individually in 
visually isolated computer booths. Each booth contained an IBM PC- 
XT, which presented further instructions and stimulus malerials rele­
vant to the first task.
Message presentation and manipulation of argument quality. Sub­
jects read that the first task concerned language comprehension. They 
then initiated presentation ofa persuasive message advocating contin­
ued oil drilling off the southwestern coast of the United States (a posi­
tion that pretesting had established as counters tt i tud inal for the major­
ity of UCSB students). The position taken in the message appeared 
first and was followed by a series of arguments, each of which was 
presented individually for a fixed amount of time. Half of the subjects 
saw arguments that pretesting had demonstrated to be strong (M  = 
11.2, where 15 = very strong). The other halfsaw arguments pretested as 
weak (M  = 7.3), F(l, 13) = 40.84, p < .0001. The two versions of the 
message were approximately equal in length.
Manipulation o f message representation. After reading the message, 
subjects were asked to answer four questions, ostensibly assessing lan­
guage comprehension. Only the last of these questions in fact referred 
to the content of the message, and this question was designed toinducc 
subjects to form either a global evaluation or to think about the details 
of the message content. Half the subjects were asked to think about 
“the strength of the arguments you saw” and to rale the strength or 
weakness of the arguments using a 9-point rating scale where 9 indi­
cated very strong. This question was intended to have subjects form a 
global evaluation related only to the strength of the arguments con­
tained in the message. The other half of the subjects were asked to 
think about the different arguments presented in the message and to 
indicate how many d ifferent arguments had been presented. This ques­
tion was designed to make subjects think about the different content of 
the various arguments presented and thus to consider several different 
aspects of message content-6 Both responses to these questions and 
response times were recorded.
After answering the other questions (which concerned, for example, 
how easy or difficult the passage was to understand, whether there was 
adequate time in which to read it, and whether subjects would prefer to 
see the message all at once or sentence by sentence), subjects were 
asked to leave their computer booth and return to the reception room.
Mood induction. Subjects were met by a new experimenter who 
explained that he or she was pretesting brief video clips for use in a 
future study. Subjects were asked to watch one clip and answer some 
questions about it. Subjects in whom a positive mood was to be in­
duced watched a 5-min comedy segment taken from the television 
program “Saturday Night Live." Subjects in the neutral mood condi­
tion watched a 5-min segment about winecorking. Subjects in whom 
negative mood was to be induced watched a 5-min segment about a 
summer camp for children with cancer. After walching the video, sub­
jects were asked severaJ questions, among them an item that served as a 
check on the effectiveness of the mood manipulations. Subjects re­
sponded to the question “How do you feel now?" by checking a 9-point 
rating scale ranging from 1 {sad) to 9 (happy). After completing the 
video rating task, subjects returned to their computer booths to answer 
some final questions about the language comprehension task.
Dependent Measures
Attitude judgments. Subjects were first asked to indicate their 
agreement with the statement that “offshore oil drilling in the south­
western United States should be continued." Subjects responded by
marking a 9-point scale on which 1 = strongly disagree and 9 = strongly 
agree. Responses and response latencies were recorded.
Judgment-related thought listing. Subjects were then given a sheet of 
paper divided into response spaces and headed with instructions to 
write down all thoughts they had “while they were thinking about 
their answer" on the oil drilling issue. Subjects were assured they did 
not have to fill all the provided response spaces, and they were re­
quested lo record only those thoughts they had while actually making 
the judgment.
Finally, subjects responded to five questions, again presented on the 
computer. Subjects were asked whether their attitude response was 
based more on the content of the message or more on prior knowledge, 
whether it was based on an overall evaluation or on some specific 
arguments, how sure they were of their position, how important the 
issue was to them, and, finally, how persuasive they had found the 
message to be. Responses were all made on 9-point scales, and re­
sponses and response latencies were automatically recorded.
Results and Discussion 
Effectiveness o f Manipulations
Subjects’ ratings of how happy or sad they felt immediately 
before assessment o f  the attitude judgment were analyzed in a 3 
(positive, neutral, or negative mood) X  2 (strong or weak argu­
ments) X 2 (global or detailed information easily accessible) 
ANOVA. This revealed a significant main effect o f  the mood 
manipulation, F (2 ,169) = 76.59, p  < .0005. Subjects who had 
watched the comedy segment reported feeling happier (M  =
7.21) than both subjects who watched the wine segment (M  =
6.02), ¿(169) = 4.62, p < ,0005, and subjects who had watched 
the segment about children with cancer (M  = 4.05), i(l69) =
12.30, p  <  .0005. Moreover, subjects who bad watched the seg­
ment on children with cancer reported feeling less happy than 
subjects who had watched the wine segment, i(l69) = 7.5, p  < 
.0005.
In addition, subjects asked to form a global evaluation by 
judging the quality o f  presented arguments rated the strong 
arguments as stronger (M  = 6.26) than the weak arguments 
(M =  4.09), F(l, 85) = 34.31, p  <  .0005, paralleling the pretest 
data. No other significant main effects or interactions were ob­
tained. Furthermore, all subjects rated strong arguments as 
more persuasive (M  = 5.69) than weak arguments {M =  3.52), 
F(2 , 164) = 55.40, p < .001 (all other ps >  .10), in response to 
the last question o f the experiment
Subjects who were asked for the number o f  different argu­
ments of the message estimated the message to comprise an 
average of 4.32 arguments. No significant main effects or inter­
actions were found on this measure.
The time subjects needed to answer these questions was ana­
lyzed in a 3 (positive, neutral, or negative mood) X 2 (strong or 
weak arguments) x  2 (global evaluation or detail information) 
ANOVA. As intended, it took subjects longer to respond to the 
question about the number o f  different arguments in the mes­
sage (M  = 15.11) than to question about overall message
* Note that emphasizing different made it more likely that subjects 
were thinking of uncorrelated than of correlated arguments, which 
seems an important mediator between complexity of representations 
and extremity of judgments (Judd & Lusk, 1984),
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strength (M =  8.89), F(2,169)= 38.02, p <  .0005. There were no 
other effects.
Agreement With the Advocated Position
The primary analysis of subjects’ reported agreement with 
the position advocated by the counterattitudinal message con­
sisted of the planned contrast testing the differential impact of 
strong compared with weak arguments according to the hypoth­
eses outlined earlier. Ifa global evaluation was not easily accessi­
ble, we expected to replicate consistent findings for the encod­
ing o f persuasive messages: a differential impact of strong ver­
sus weak arguments for subjects in a bad or a neutral mood, but 
not for subjects in a good mood. If a global evaluation was 
available, judgments of all subjects were expected to reflect 
message quality; however, this effect was expected to be more 
pronounced for subjects in a good or neutral mood than for 
subjects in a bad mood. The contrast weights used in the 
planned comparison and the means for agreement with the 
advocated position appear in Table 2.
The results o f the planned contrast confirmed the predic­
tion, producing the expected significant interaction, i(169) =
2.10, p  < .04. As the means in Table 2 show, the differential 
impact of strong and weak arguments was dramatically pro­
nounced for subjects in a positive mood in the global evaluation 
condition. Subjects in a neutral mood also appeared to rely on 
the global evaluation when it was easily accessible, being more 
influenced by it than were the negative mood subjects. When 
different aspects o f the message content were made available in 
the detailed representation condition, the differential impact 
o f  strong and weak arguments was more pronounced for the 
neutral and negative mood subjects than for the happy subjects.
In combination, this pattern o f  findings indicates that sub­
jects in a neutral mood used the representation that was most 
accessible at the time o f judgment, producing a more pro­
nounced impact o f  argument quality when they were induced 
to form a global rather than a detailed representation of the 
message. In contrast, subjects in a good mood relied on a global 
representation if  easily accessible but did not make use o f  a 
detailed representation, resulting in the absence o f an impact of 
argument quality under the latter condition. Thus, when global 
evaluations were not accessible to happy subjects the results 
paralleled the previously obtained effects o f  mood on message 
elaboration. This finding also strengthens our conclusion that 
the attitude judgments reported here were not made during 
encoding and merely retrieved. Although finding effects for the 
impact of mood at judgment eliminates the possibility that 
attitudes formed on-line were simply retrieved, it is possible 
that such attitudes could be relied on to greater or lesser extent 
depending on the recipient’s mood state. Because o f the simplic­
ity o f  this retrieval strategy; subjects in a good mood might be 
most likely to rely on it. However, it was precisely under these 
conditions— when subjects were required to think about the 
different arguments o f the message and were in a good mood 
when reporting their attitudes— that no differences between 
strong and weak arguments were obtained. We assume that lack 
o f differentiation o f strong and weak arguments at either en­
coding or judgment both reflect the tendency for happy sub­
jects to simplify processing. Just as elaboration at encoding
Table 2
Attitude Change as a Function o f  Mood, Type o f  Representation,
and Argument Quality (Experiment 2)
Global Detail




Neutral 6.0 3.8 4.3 3.2
Negative 4.5 3.5 4.1 3.1
Positive 1
Contrast weights 
-1 - 2 2
Neutral 1 -1 1 -1
Negative -2 2 I - I
Note. The possible range of values for agreement was 1 (strongly dis­
agree) to 9 (strongly agree).
requires a considerable amount o f  processing, so loo does re­
trieving the content o f  or responses to the message. Presumably, 
subjects in a good mood were unable or unwilling to engage in 
this processing and so the impact o f  message qua) ity on attitude 
judgments was eliminated. Another possibility is that in sim­
plifying the processing task, subjects in a good mood used their 
estimates o f  the number o f different arguments contained in 
the message as a heuristic cue in forming their attitudinal re­
sponses. Given that the number o f  arguments was the same 
under both message quality conditions, this strategy would re­
sult in similar attitude judgments.
Finally, the accessibility of a global representation had little 
impact on subjects in a bad mood, resulting in a similar impact 
o f argument quality under both representation conditions.7 Pre- 
sumably, subjects in a bad mood engaged in a thorough recall o f  
detailed information regardless o f what representation had 
been made accessible (Schwarz, 1990), resulting in less extreme 
attitude judgments.
Latencies for Attitude Judgments
Raw latencies for the attitude judgments were unaffected by 
the experimental conditions (all Fs < 1). At first glance the 
absence o f  effects on latencies for attitude judgment may seem 
inconsistent with the assumption that subjects in a good mood 
simplified their processing. However, individuals in a good 
mood are assumed to engage in less effortful processing be­
cause o f  motivation or reduced capacity (Isen, 1987; Mackie & 
Worth, 1989; Schwarz, 1990), either o f  which might produce 
slower response times.
Judgment-Related Thought Listing
The thoughts subjects reported having while making their 
attitude judgments were coded by two independent judges.
7 Accord ingly, the simple interaction of argument quality and type of 
representation was most pronounced under good mood, f ( l,  169) = 
8.01, p < .005, and least pronounced under bad mood, il( l, 169) = 0,01, 
with the neutral mood in between, F(l, 169) = 1.28, p < .26.
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Judges agreed on 90% of responses, and all disagreements were 
decided by a third judge. Most important, judges rated each 
statement as either specific or global. The first two thoughts 
subjects reported were analyzed in a 3 (mood) X 2 (type o f  mes­
sage representation) ANOVA. We focused on the first two 
thoughts to assess which thoughts were most accessible and to 
avoid including global thoughts that were produced as a result 
o f specific thoughts produced about the message. Subjects 
tended to report more global thoughts after they had formed a 
global evaluation (.M  = 0.29) than after they had thought about 
the number of arguments (M  -  0.17), F(l. 175) = 3.13, p  < .08. 
In addition, a main effect o f induced mood was obtained. F(2. 
175) = 3.55, p < .04. reflecting that subjects in a positive {M  = 
0.32) or neutral (Af = 0.25) mood reported more global thought 
statements than did subjects in a negative mood (M  = 0.10); 
¿(169) = 2.55. p < .02; and /(169) = 1.76, p < .08.
Additional analyses revealed that these differences between 
subjects in a positive or a neutral mood and subjects in a nega­
tive mood were significant if  subjects had formed a global evalu­
ation (M  = 0.39 and M -  0.37 vs. M =  0.10), /(169)= 2.38, p < 
.02, and ¿(169) = 2.21, p < .03, but not if subjects had thought 
about the number o f  arguments (M = 0.25 and ,W= 0.14 vs. M ~  
0.10), /(169) = 1.23, ns. and t < 1. However, the corresponding 
interaction did not reach significance.8
Presumably, subjects in a good and neutral mood were more 
likely to report global thoughts than subjects in a bad mood 
because they used these thoughts— made accessible through 
the global representation manipulation— for their preceding 
attitude judgment. Additional correlational analyses supported 
this conclusion; Significant relations between attitude judg­
ments on the one hand and rated overall strength of the argu­
ments as well as number o f  general (favorable or unfavorable) 
thoughts on the other hand were only observed for subjects in a 
positive and neutral mood, but not for subjects in a negative 
m ood.9
General Discussion
The results o f these studies provide further evidence for the 
assumption that individuals’ mood states affect their process­
ing of persuasive communications. More important, the results 
clearly demonstrate that mood effects on processing styles are 
not limited to a specific processing stage but do in fact have 
observable effects on different stages o f  processing. However, 
the effects o f mood on attitude change produced by a persua­
sive message differs dramatically depending on the particular 
processes that mood influences.
At the encoding stage, recipients in a positive mood appear to 
simplify their processing by reducing the amount o f  message 
elaboration in which they engage. Accordingly, judgments 
based on this reduced processing do not reflect differences in 
the quality o f message content. On the other hand, recipients in 
negative or neutral mood states are more likely to engage in a 
systematic processing o f  the content o f  the message, and differ­
ential effects o f strong compared with weak arguments are thus 
obtained. Extending previous research that involved possible 
confounds of mood at the time of encoding and mood at the 
time o f  attitude assessment (Bless et al., 1990; Mackie & Worth, 
1989; Worth & Mackie. 1987), Experiment 1 demonstrated that
recipients’ mood at the time o f  encoding is sufficient to pro­
duce the previously observed effects.
Independent o f their influence on initial message elabora­
tion, moods induced after the message was encoded also in­
fluenced attitude judgments. Although this influence resulted 
in a completely different pattern of attitude reports, it presum­
ably reflects the same underlying process. Just as individuals in 
a good mood appear to simplify processing at encoding by 
failing to elaborate, the results in the relevant conditions o f  
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that individuals who are in a good 
mood at the time o f attitude assessment simplify- processing by 
failing to retrieve details o f or responses to the previously en­
coded message. Rather, they seem to access some global evalua­
tive representation o f the message, which may serve as a heuris­
tic cue in forming their attitude judgment. Given that judg­
ments that are based on simple cognitive structures tend to be 
more extreme than judgments based on more detail (Judd & 
Lusk, 1984; Linville, 1982: Linville & Jones, 1980). this process 
resulted in an accentuated impact o f message quality when sub* 
jects were in a good mood. This was the case when no specific 
representation was elicited (Experiment 1) as well as when a 
global representation was deliberately evoked (Experiment 2). 
Forming a detailed representation of the content of the mes­
sage, on the other hand, apparently interfered with the use of 
this heuristic, resulting in the absence of an impact of message 
quality (Experiment 2) that parallels the effect o f  positive mood 
at message elaboration. Thus, message quality had an impact 
only when it had been incorporated into a heuristic cue that 
could be used to simplify processing.
In contrast, subjects in a bad mood differentiated between 
strong and weak arguments independently o f whether mood 
was present when the message was encoded or when attitude 
judgments were reported and independently of whether a 
global evaluation was easily accessible or not. This suggests that 
subjects in a bad mood engaged in a systematic processing of 
the message whether at encoding or by recalling the content
1 Further analyses revealed that mood inductions did not affect the
total number of thoughts subjects reported (p > .20) for all effects
involving mood. Subjects asked to think abouL the number of different
arguments of the message reported having slightly more thoughts
when the message quality was poor (.V/ = 4.9) than when it was strong 
(A/ = 4.1), /(169) -  1.95, p < .06. whereas subjects who had formed a 
global evaluation reported as many thoughts when the arguments were
weak (Af = 4.8) as when they were strong (M -  4.4), / < 1. resulting in an
interaction between argument quality and representation type, F(l, 
169) = 3.90, p  < .05. An analysis of the time subjects needed for report­
ing their thoughts revealed that subjects used more time when they 
were exposed to weak than to strong arguments (M = 166.8 s vs. M  =
138.8 s), fO , 169) = 4.67, p < .04, all other ps > .10.
9 Correlations between attitude judgments and rated overall strength 
o f arguments were as follows: For positive mood, r= .29. n -  31. p < .06; 
for neutral mood, r -  .39, n = 30, p < .02; and for negative mood, r = 
-.11, ns. Correlations between attitude judgments and number of gen­
eral favorable thoughts were as follows: For positive mood. r=  .42, n = 
31. pc.09; for neutral mood. r=  .28, n = 30. p  <.07: and for negative 
mood, r— -.20, ns. Correlations between attitude judgmems and num­
ber of general unfavorable thoughts were as follows: For positive mood, 
r= -.38, n = 31, p < .02; for neutral mood, r= -.53. n= 30. p < .01; and 
for negative mood, r ~ ~ .  19. ns.
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and thoughts elicited by the message at the tim e o f  judgment. 
In fact, subjects in a bad mood apparently did not use a heuris­
tic processing strategy even when it was made possible by the 
presence o f an easily accessible global representation.
The present results extend a processing approach to the issue 
o f  how affective states influence persuasion (for overviews see 
Mackie, Asuncion, & Rosselli, in press; M ackie & Worth, 1991; 
Schwarz et al., 1991). Previous studies identified capacity (Isen, 
1987; Mackie & Worth, 1989) and motivation (Bless et al„ 1990; 
Schwarz, 1990) as possible antecedents o f  the finding that indi­
viduals in a good mood tend to simplify processing (for over­
views see Fiedler, 1988; Isen, 1987; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & 
Bless, 1991), and thus show reduced elaboration at encoding, 
com pared with subjects in a bad or neutral mood. This in turn 
reduces the im pact o f argument quality on the attitudinal out­
comes o f happy compared with neutral or sad subjects. The 
present studies extend the range o f  the processing analysis o f 
m ood effects in persuasion in two directions.
First, the studies provide clear evidence o f  m ood effects on 
judgm ental processes contributing to attitude formation and 
change (independently o f effects at encoding). Indeed, the pre­
sented findings emphasize the importance o f  delineating the 
different stages involved in processing persuasive communica­
tions. Both experiments indicate that the elaboration of mes­
sage content at encoding is not the only variable that may lead 
to differences in  the attitudinal impact o f strong and weak 
arguments.
Second, our findings point out the im portance o f specify­
ing how information relevant to forming an attitude 
judgm ent—particularly information from persuasive messages 
— is represented in memory. O ur data challenge the notion that 
attitude judgments formed or reported som e tim e after mes­
sage presentation are either retrieved from m em ory intact (Lin- 
gle & Ostrom, 1981) or calculated from retrieved cognitive re­
sponses made during initial encoding (Greenwald, 1968; Love
& Greenwald, 1978). We argue that, in addition, subjects may 
also rely on nonattitudinal global representations o f  the mes­
sage formed during encoding. Further work on this topic could 
benefit, as ours did, from models that address how social knowl­
edge in  other dom ains is represented.
In  fact, the persuasion dom ain seems to  be especially fruitful 
for further investigating the differential implications of affec­
tive states on processing in general. Tracing the impact o f affect 
on many domain-specific judgments has proven difficult be­
cause little is known about the cognitive processes involved in 
m aking such judgments. In the attitude dom ain, however, 
much is now known about the various processes that underlie 
attitude formation or change. Our results indicate that re­
searchers will need to  dedicate more attention to isolating the 
im pact o f m ood on various and multiple processing stages. The 
im pact o f  affective states on cognitive processing is not limited 
to  a  single processing stage. Rather, the increased heuristic pro­
cessing under positive mood, and increased systematic process­
ing under negative mood, is likely to show different effects at 
different processing stages, thus adding to the complexity of 
the affect-cognition interplay.
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